This is from the Combat Studies Institute as part of the Leavenworth papers. A very detailed study. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/miller/miller.asp
Tobruk Came across this Report Last week made by Lt.R.V.Crane regarding the use of the 3.7" Gun in an Anti Tank Roll. As the subject is pondered upon from time to time I thought I would be post it. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- I was commanding A&B Sections of 277 Battery,68th H.A.A. Rgt. on"Charle Gun Site on 20/6/42. It was early in the afternoon that we first had word from G.O.R. that Enemy Tanks had broken through the perimiter on the Eastern side and we must prepare to engage them. We continued to engage any Enemy which came within range. At approximately 16:30hrs we were informed by G.O.R.that "George" H.A.A. Gun site was surrounded by Tanks and was engaging them. We could observe this from our gun position.Shortly afterwards we were informed bu G.O.R. and also observed for ourselves,that our other Troop on"Monkey"position was being attacked by Tanks.We immediately realised that our turn would come next and we prepared to engage them. I gave orders to my M.T.Officer Mr.Simpson that all transport and non-manning personnel must move at once well behind the Guns between Gun position and the Coast. I then gave the order to the No.1s that they must lower their Gun walls to enable them to fire at zero angle of sight. Here we experienced our first difficulty. The walls,concreted by another Troop during the long seige,were built in such a way that it was difficult to lower them.However we did the best we possibly could. It was next that we observed eleven German Tanks moving across our front from East to West along the top of an escarpment towards"Monkey" Gun Site. When directly opposite us they turned and disappeared down the Wadi between the escarpment and my Gun position coming straight towards us. It was useless,with the ground sights we had on the Guns,to engage them on the escarpment,which was a distance of 1,500yds. I then gave the order to Nos 1 of the Guns that they must hold their fire until the Tanks next appeared which would be 200yds away. I next gave the order for the G.L. Equipment to be destroyed,which was effectively carried out just before the Tanks appeared. At approximately 17:30hrs we opened fire at 200yds.range on the leading Tank. We did not register at first on this Tank and the remainder scattered to Right and Left,encircling us. They immediately started machine-gunning and shelling the Guns,which were now firing continuously. After 30 minutes we found that No.1 Gun could not get low enough,owing to the walls,and all its shots were too high. It was useless continuing with this Gun,so I gave the order to destroy the gun and the team to retire towards the Coast where they would join the remainder of the Troop. The other three Guns continued to fire effectively. It was difficult to accurately observe the effects of the shots owing to the dust created by firing of the Guns.The command post was now full of spare personnel,including the Instrument Nos. I then decided to try and get them away as it was unlikely we should be firing at aeroplanes in the near future. The men followed me out of the command post and we made a run for it towards the M.T. About 400yds from the Guns I was wounded in the chest by a machine gun bullet from one of the Tanks and decided to return to the command post.. Most of the men got away but some were wounded. When I got back to the command post my wound was not too good and I handed over command of the troop to Mr.Toppin. I then lay in the command post for the remainder of the action and the rest of the story comes from Mr.Toppin. By this time each Gun had received hits from shells.Several of the Gun teams were wounded. No 3 Gun received a direct hit on a shell as it was in the loading tray,and this knocked out all the Gun team except the No.1. Things were going badly now for us and when all the Guns had been put out of action and several of the crews wounded it was useless to carry on. At approximately 20:00hrs,after the action lasting two and a half hours,Mr Toppin decided to surrender but found that the enemy had also had enough and had withdrawn. The wounded were then attended to.At the same time the instruments in the command post were destroyed. One of the Vehicles got through to the Beach Hospital and soon afterwards Ambulances arrived and removed the wounded,myself included. Mr.Toppin had been slightly wounded but had been able to carry on There are several interesting points I learned afterwards from Mr.Toppin. Firstly we had temporarily put out of action six of the eleven Tanks which attacked us. Secondly,the behaviour of the Gun teams.especially the No.1s, had been excellent throughout the action. Also I would like to mention that throughout the action the Tanks had been at a distance of 2-300yds from the Guns. The chief lesson to be learnt from this action is that any forward area where there is any likelihood of the A.A. Gun positions being attacked by Tanks the Gun pit walls must be constructed so that they can be lowered in a few minutes to enable the Guns to fire at zero angle of sight. Lt. R.V.Crane Site Commander
3.7" A.A. Gun Hi Geoff, I should imagine they were using"Bird Shot". How would it have ended using A.P.and being able to lower the Walls. Brian
3.7" A.A. Gun What a pity it carried the Tag "A.A." God forbid that the Ruperts should sanction its use for anything else; but at least one had the sense to do so. Could it be that the only other option was just to Roll over. Brian
As for the Ninth (9th) Aussie Division in Tobruk, don't forget that the 18th Brigade of the Seventh (7th) AIF Division was their from start to finish. Also the 9th Divvy RAASC men were armed and acted as Infantry on the Badia Road to Mediterranean Ocean part of Red defensive line for Aussie duration of seige. CBR
Don't worry Cobber, we don't forget the "Silent Seventh". I think that Morshead having them in the UK, when another Brigade was required as a reserve, they would have been one of the best trained even though their training regime was centred around a preparedness for invading paratroopers in the UK.
Also their were elements from two (2) Aussie Btns who were not evac'ed from Tobruk by Ship, due to the unfortunate sinking or damage by German Bombers during voyage into Tobruk of one of the Scrap Iron Flotilla Ships. (Another of lord haw whore's so called insults again turned around into a badge of honour by the Australian Sailors who manned this Aussie Destroyer force) These soldiers created a composite Btn and kept fighting in the fortress untill the siege was temporarily lifted and these AIF men walked out, actually f,w,i,know they refused a lift in a truck for the start of the journey out of the fortress it's self, they had walked in to Tobruk at the start of April and now in December they were walking out of the fortress. You are right about the 16th Bgd onwards being named due to their being 15 Bgds in the CMF/AMF, the Btns were numbered after their WW1 conterparts and kept a similar shoulder colour patch as the originals. Ie 2/1 2/2, 2/3 Btns. While the CMF/AMF forces had their own 1st, 2nd, 3rd Btns, it's Brigades were based on the WW1 1st AIF Force, and the Bgds remained in the area that the first WW Bgds wer recruited from. I wish I had more time or i would find all the appropiate info confirming the above posts.
Not Afrika Corps but certainly Rommel, on D Day 6th June 1944, it is a matter of historical fact that one of Montgomery's aides said to him, " I wish we had 9th Australian with us today" There is nothing more to add.
