Air Commodore Arthur Henry (Harry) Cobby, CBE, DSO, DFC, GM Date of birth: 26 August 1894 Place of birth: Prahran, VIC Date of death: 11 November 1955 Arthur Henry (Harry) Cobby 000811 Harry Cobby was born in Prahran, Melbourne, on 26 August 1894. At the age of 18 Cobby received a commission in the 48th Infantry (Brighton Rifles) and when the First World War began he was quick to offer himself to the AIF. However, his employer, the Commonwealth Bank, refused to release him. Cobby finally enlisted in the Australian Flying Corps (AFC) in 1916 despite a self-confessed lack of interest in flying. In October 1916 Cobby was sent to Point Cook for flying instruction. There he became an original member of No. 4 Squadron, AFC. With no more than 30 minutes of flying instruction behind him, Cobby arrived in England with the squadron in March 1917. By December, having now learnt to fly Sopwith Camels, the squadron was in France. Although their training had ended, Cobby - who had only flown solo for 12 hours - noted the squadron was made up of novices. In February 1918 he made the first of his 29 kills, the highest score by a member of the AFC. By May, Cobby was an experienced combat airman, having flown against enemy aircraft and participated in low-level attacks against German troops during their March offensive. The latter, which subjected an aircraft to sustained ground fire, was a particularly dangerous undertaking. On 21 May Cobby shot down the first of 13 German observation balloons; like ground strafing, this brought a pilot dangerously close to ground fire. On 25 May 1918 Cobby was promoted to captain, having by now regularly led his flight on operations. In June 1918 he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross; less than a month later he received a bar to that decoration. On 16 August he led an attack on a German airfield at Harboudin, the largest bombing raid carried out by the Allies in France to that date. He led a similar raid the next day and was awarded the Distinguished Service Order. In September Cobby returned to England as an instructor; he was still trying to rejoin a combat unit when the war ended. Cobby led the AFC fly-past over London on ANZAC Day 1919. In 1921 he became a foundation member of the newly formed RAAF, resigning in 1936 with the rank of wing commander. When the Second World War began, Cobby returned to the RAAF. He served in a number of capacities and, as an air commodore, won the George Medal in 1943 for rescuing survivors of an air crash in which he had been involved as a passenger. In April 1945 as Air Officer Commanding, 1st Tactical Air Force on Morotai, Cobby was presented with the resignations of several high ranking personal who were annoyed at flying dangerous operations against what they considered "senseless unimportant ground targets". Known as the "Morotai Mutiny", the episode resulted in Cobby's sacking. He left the RAAF in 1946 and joined the Department of Civil Aviation, where he held senior appointments until his death on 11 November 1955.
One wonders how and where these people get there energy? Remarkable. Unfortunately the LG doesn't have the citation for his GM. I shall ask around to see if anyone does. It involved him rescuing from a crashed Catalina.
Clive Caldwell and Bobby Gibbes were part of this "mutiny". The "senseless unimportant ground targets" were the remnants of Japanese forces left behind by the US-led island hopping campagin. Cut off from Japan but still dangerous to flyers.
These pilots were not spineless wonders. They were "coalface" combat fighters whose Aircraft was not designed for the job at hand. Excerpts from the inquiry: One consequence of MacArthur's involvement in the SWPA which had direct bearing on the "mutiny", was his determination to keep the RAAF out of direct action with the Japanese, with the plum air offence roles being taken by the Americans. Looking back on the role of MacArthur in the South West Pacific, former Chief of Air Staff George Jones commented that MacArthur had "sidestepped" Australia out of the final victory over Japan, as he wanted all the glory for himself. (79) Ultimately, this secondary role in the final stages of the War with Japan, resulted in considerable discontent amongst the Australians. In his Report, Barry stated that it was apparent, that, as a consequence of this arrangement: RAAF Headquarters had no control over the operational role assigned to First TAF and therefore cannot be held responsible for that role or for the manner in which operational activities within the assignment to First TAF were carried out ... Even when First TAF came for the first time under RAAF Command, RAAF Headquarters still had no control over, and thus no responsibility for, First TAF's operational activities. (80) Vindicating the stand taken by Arthur and his fellow "mutineers", Barry stated that Undoubtedly a conditioning factor of great importance in the state of affairs that developed at First TAF ... Inevitably it produced a feeling of being in a backwater, as it were, far removed from the progress of the Pacific War. This feeling was not dissipated by knowledge of the forthcoming operations against the enemy in Borneo. I have no doubt that a considerable amount of effort was expended by the Wings within First TAF on useless targets." (81) He concluded that The evidence satisfies me that, upon the facts known to them, they were reasonably entitled to conclude that the operations upon which they were engaged were wasteful and unnecessary. I find therefore that Group Captains Arthur and Caldwell, and Squadron Leaders Gibbes, Waddy and Grace sincerely believed, upon the information at their disposal, that the operations which they have described at length in their evidence were of no real value in the prosecution of the war. (82)
Interesting that the official inquiry makes such a strong comment about MacArthur - we know what we think of him, and know about his complete disdain for the Allies, but this is hard evidence that officialdom wasn't averse to making their feelings known in public. Nice one. I think this is also evidence of what I was saying in another thread about my doubts that MacArthur would have allowed RAF Lancaster squadrons to be used in Downfall.
I've kept quiet on it, Geoff, as I'm by no means an expert on him etc, but he had first class forces at hand in the form of Australian and Kiwi men and material, forces that had helped hold the line while his country (and ours) got its act together, and he simply ignored their efforts, skills and reliability. Would anyone in their right mind want people like Caldwell and Gibbes in the rear mopping up or leading units at the front?
To their credit, the USAAF pilots were dumbfounded and very disappointed that these experienced pilots were left behind to sweep the floor.
As is so often the case, the man on the ground doesn't care where one's comrade-in-arms comes from, as long as he's watching his back. It's the generals & politicians who think that their men should get the "glory".
