A lot of carriers were built and destroyed during WWII from all sides. I do not have detailed account for the exactly numbers. I know Germans had sunk carriers, Japanese had sunk carriers. So did the Americans. Germans had no carrier if I am not mistaken. To my limited information, the only confirmed countries with carriers were UK, US, and Japan. In the Battle of Coral Sea, the U.S. lost one carrier, and another was damaged. In the Battle of Midway, the U.S. lost one carrier, while Japan lost four carriers. In the Battle of Guadalcanal, one U.S. carrier was sunk. There was this biggest carrier battle during one of the island hopping operating of the U.S. Where 6 Japanese carriers tried to reinforce the trapped the ground force on one of their islands. U.S. 5th fleet met them head on with 15 carriers. Two Japanese carriers were sunk before they retreated. It was bigger than Midway. What are some other battles where carriers had been sunk? What are the total number of carriers being built and lost by each country? Why didn't the Germans build carriers? What if they did, will it make a difference in the outcome of the war during some point?
The French also had an aircraft carrier during the war, the Béarn. In 1939 Béarn's battle group had the task to hunt down the Graf Spee, which was later scuttled by her captain off Montevideo. Later, as France was invaded by ther Nazis, Béarn successfully transported the gold bullion reserves of the Bank of France to safety in Canada, and then took refuge in the French Caribbean island of Martinique to avoid falling into German hands. She stayed there until sent to the US for a major refit in 1944, which finished just before the end of hostilities. The Germans never had an aircraft carrier because it was not permitted under the peace terms imposed by the victorious allies after the First World War. I'm not sure if the word "aircraft carrier" was actually included in the peace terms, because back in 1919 the carriers were just coming out of nappies. But the terms specifically prohibited Germany from producing vessels of more than a certain length, which would have excluded carriers. That's why the high quality battleships produced by the Nazis were called "pocket" battleships. They were just up to the limits imposed at Versailles, which were smaller than conventional battleship design at the time to prevent German battleship construction. I think the other reason why Germany never built a carrier is because they never planned for the war to turn out the way it did (well who does?!). Their game plan was to exert military superiority over central Europe, where naval power isn't a priority. One of the curiosities of history is that the Hungarian puppet dictator, an ally of Hitler, was an admiral: Admiral Horthy. Hungary is landlocked!
The U S Navy had, over the course of the war, 119 carriers of all types; 11 were lost to enemy action. Britain’s Royal Navy had 64 carriers of all types; 3 were decommissioned for various reasons, 1 lost to an accidental explosion, 1 laid up damaged, and 7 lost to enemy action. The Japanese Navy had 25 carriers of all types; 1 was laid up damaged, another beached and capsized, 20 were lost to enemy action. The French Navy, as noted above, had 1 carrier, converted to an aircraft transport in 1944. This count is for commissioned naval vessels designated as aircraft carriers only. It does not include sea/floatplane carriers/tenders, MAC civilian operated convoy escorts, nor aircraft carrier/transports operated by the Japanese Army. The Germans attempted to build a carrier, the Graf Zeppelin. It was never completed and, in truth, was a joke in terms of carrier operations - anything that could be designed to be done the hardest way possible with the least efficiency was incorporated in the design. Not to mention that by the time the ship came off the ways there was next to nothing available for escorts had it ever been competed. The Italians had a passenger liner they were finishing as a carrier conversion when they surrendered to the Allies. The Italian Navy scuttled the ship to keep it from falling into German hands. A visit to Andrew Toppan's Haze Grey and Underway site would reveal all the details.
Spot on R Leonard! I've always thought it such a pity that aircraft carriers are not mentioned even once in the Sound of Music. Perhaps Julie Andrews insisted on that in her contract. Enough mirth.... that's fascinating info about the Graf Zeppelin. Doesn't seem like the best plan in naval history, does it? Even assuming she had been completed and provided with a decent number of escorts to form an effective battle group, I see two further problems. 1) What exactly would her mission have been? Destruction of incoming food and troop transport in the Atlantic? I don't think she could have done a better job than if Germany had dedicated those resources building her to enlarge the deadly U-boat wolf packs that were wreaking havoc with Allied shipping. Or would she have been sent to confront an Allied carrier group of similar capacity? One carrier against 2 navies that could put together groups of 3 or even more would be a dangerous duel. 2) Where would she operate from? To link up with the Tirpitz in Norway would be a good idea perhaps, but then you'd need a protected base in occupied Europe for this entire group. This requires a lot of logistical backup.
It looked like the allied force had overwhelming number. 119 carriers from the U.S. alone is quite impressive. Although I think many of them are just light carriers. When I was going through some sea battles, it talked about some U.S. fleet had lots of light carriers with the capacity of only 20 aircraft on each of them. I guess light carriers are easier, faster, cheaper to build, while multiple of them can still carry a sizable fleet of aircraft. It was a good strategy. Fleet carriers take forever to build and cost a fortune. Why didn't the axis try to build light carriers to fill in the gap? For a country surrounded by sea from 3 sides, Italian navy seems to be such pushover.
It is good to remember that it took the Royal Navy, the US Navy, and the Japanese navy more than 20 years, each, to develop their individual carrier designs and differing operating doctrines. It was ludicrous for the the Germans or the Italians to even conceive of starting from scratch and jumping full bore into the carrier business. The shallowness of that conceit is amply demonstrated in the Graf Zeppelin concept.
As for the carrier designs, who has the best carriers? Or are they pretty much the same? If I remember correctly, carrier was fairly new. There was a test done by the U.S. air force to try sink a captured German battleship with bombers. Not sure which year was it, although it was after WWI for sure. The end result was the battleship was finally sunk, and it was the first ship ever sunk by aircraft. Japanese military were also there as observers. They found it was interesting, and that's how they started to develop carriers. I know the Germans were unable to build such carriers due to the treaty after WWI. But why didn't Italy try to build carriers? They were supposed to be a sea power consider their country is facing ocean from 3 sides... but they couldn't even control the sea right in front of their door step during WWII.
The Italians logically should have developed their sea power more, considering that Mussolini's dreams of empire were aimed at Africa, so any Italian military presence in somewhere like Libya or Ethiopia, say, would have to be supplied and supported by naval forces coming from Italy. On the night of 11/12 th November 1940, an airborne attack launched by British carriers effectively destroyed the Italian fleet in their base in Taranto. Half of the Regia Marina capital ships were lost in that action, and although the Italians were quick to sortie again to harrass supply convoys to Malta, it was a deadly blow to their plans for dominance of the eastern Mediterranean and hence their ambitions in Africa. And who studied this attack in great detail? The Imperial Japanese Navy. The tactics and technology successfully applied by Admiral Cunningham in Taranto were assimilated by the Japanese in their plans for the attack on the US at Pearl Harbor.
The inter-war Italian navy had no real use for aircraft carriers (and one wonders what they intended to do with their two mid-war conversions - my theory is they were suffering from "carrier envy"). The Regia Marina was envisioned as operating almost exclusively in the Mediterranean, their Mare Nostrum. As it was, the Regia Marina had the problem of if they wanted to operate outside the Mediterranean Sea they had to pass through one of two choke holds, both controlled by the British. As it has been pointed out, Italy is a long peninsula almost dividing the sea in two; not to mention the islands of Sicily and Sardinia plus the colonized Libya. So, with aircraft that could reach almost three quarters of the area of the Mediterranean from land bases, why would they need aircraft carriers? Probably, 1920 to 1940, they asked themselves the same question and arrived at the same answer, they did not.
Re: Mitchell and bombing ships - In the afternoon of 21 July 1921, bombers of the US Army Air Service sank the derelict war prize German battleship Ostfriesland, this after the ship was already damaged and taking on water from morning bombings conducted by Navy, Marine Corps, and Army planes, and thus proving that large, already sinking, unmanned, stationary and undefended ships are vulnerable to heavy bombers carefully lining up and take their time and dropping 2000# bombs. Who ever would have guessed? Oh, and the trick was not to actually hit the ship, but to lay the bombs alongside and by that method rupture the hull . . . also a no brainer. One might note that in end of war raids in July 1945 USN carrier aircraft dropped not a single torpedo against the remains of the Japanese fleet; even the TBM torpedo bombers dropped bombs, in the same manner, so as to rupture hulls, not poke holes in them. In fact, in that final summer at war the TBMs of TF-38, operating off the coast of Japan from 10 July 1945 to the bitter end dropped only bombs in all their strikes, no torpedoes were expended in the entire operating period.
Well, if you look at the map and Italy's geographic location, it certainly looks like they can control the sky of entire Mediterranean Sea from their homeland as well as Sicily, but the fact they couldn't even cut British supply line right in front of their door, it was quite pathetic. If they could achieve at least total sea/air supremacy around Italy, then North African campaign would be in Axis' favor. Aircraft back in WWII didn't have such long operation range. Especially fighter escorts. I would not be so confident in the ability of having air force to cover entire Mediterranean Sea if I were Italy during WWII. The lack of carriers also make long range offensive impossible. That is the very reason British could strike Italian navy in their own ports, while Italians could not do the same to the British. I also question Italian's goal. Would they really feel "enough" just to conquer the countries around Mediterranean Sea?
Lack of escorting fighters making long range operations dicey? Yes, but that is hindsight. In the interwar years the strategic belief in all the big air forces was that no matter what “the bombers would get through.” Hence no escorts. And, remember, one of the great prophets, revered by the bomber enthusiasts, of strategic bombing was the Italian, Giulo Douhet. The irony is that all one had to do was look at the early Japanese efforts in China where they, the Japanese, quickly discovered that, until what air power the Chinese had was thoroughly suppressed, escorts were, indeed, necessary. Why do you think the G4M bomber and the A6M fighter had similar long range capability? Apparently no one else got that memo or, if they did, disregarded the message due to its source - - - Asians, what do they know about modern warfare. The RAF switched to night strategic bombing operations, among other reasons, to lessen losses to interceptors; the Luftwaffe did the same, though they apparently waited a bit too long to make the decision. The USAAF, thoroughly indoctrinated in the concept of strategic bombing air power, suffered grievous losses over Europe while spooling up a long range escort doctrine. I don’t think you can saddle the blame for no escorting fighters on the Italians as solely their failure, no one else was thinking along those either. See: Development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090529-044.pdf Neglect of Long-Range Escort Development During the Interwar Years http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA393237 Airpower Strategy in the Interwar Years http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a441608.pdf Again, the USN, RN and IJN each expended 20 plus years of blood and airplanes in developing their carrier doctrines. All three came up with similar but noticeably different approaches. All three of them, though, included the concept of fighter escorts for strike forces. For the Italians, or the Germans, to think all they had to do was build a couple of carriers, throw on some hastily converted airplanes and some pilots who had practiced on a land field and they would become contenders in the aircraft carrier championship sweepstakes was not just dumb, it was stupid.
The Germans did build an aircraft carrier called the Graf Zeppelin and though the Kriegsmarine ordered two, she was the only one built. It was launched on the 8th December 1938, never used due to shifting priorities and scuttled in March 1945.
A two-parter . . . gotta remember the 10K character limit . . . Part A The Kriegsmarine had no naval doctrine that included carriers. Great Britain, Japan, and the US, the major players in the aircraft carrier business, had been operating pure aircraft carriers since the beginning of the 1920’s in case of the latter two and, without looking it up, about 1918 for Great Britain. By "pure carrier" I mean carriers whose airplanes are wheeled, are recovered aboard ship by some sort of arrestor arrangement (however primitive in the early years), and could also be operated from land bases. Further, the aircraft in use were generally specifically designed for carrier operations. The navies of these three nations worked out the problems and challenges of carrier operations in the 20’s and 30’s and became, each in their own way, the best in the business. The feeble attempts of the Germans to develop aircraft carriers, much less carrier aircraft, were, frankly, laughable in retrospect. All you have to do is look at the main guns and their placement aboard Graf Zeppelin and it’s obvious that the Kreigsmarine considered surface vessels as the major threat to their carrier. Even pre-war, the RN, IJN, and USN could have told them that that was a waste of time and effort; that the real threat to the ship was in the air. The USN went down that road with Lexington class and their 8” turrets. By the mid 1930’s it was recognized that those guns were so much dead weight. Note that as soon after the Japanese attacked Pearl the 8-inchers were removed and replaced on Saratoga with 5-inch dual purpose and on Lexington with temporary 1.1 mounts (Lexington was scheduled to receive 5-inch mounts, but she was sunk at Coral Sea before that could happen). I don’t even want to enter a discussion of Graf Zeppelin’s Rube Goldberg-like trolley/catapult arrangement, an over-engineered contraption obviously designed by someone without a clue and certain sure to ensure fast launch evolutions. Further, how many pilots, crew, and aircraft was Germany prepared to sacrifice to bring their carrier into operational being? Carrier aviation, though somewhat safer today, and "safer" is an extremely subjective term, in the 1930’s, 40’s and 50’s was an extremely dangerous profession. Where were the Germans planning on training their folks to operate their hybrid craft off carriers? In the Baltic? How nice for them, nice enclosed seas with, compared to the reaches of the North Atlantic’s well known nice calm waters. What’s going to happen when a pilot who has trained in calm waters is suddenly faced with crappy North Atlantic weather with the horizon a short 3 miles away and a flight deck that rises and falls 25 to 30 feet as he attempts to land. Did the Kreigsmarine have a plan for training Landing Signal Officers to deal with this problem as they coaxed the pilots aboard? Were there flight deck officers who knew by feel just when to launch a plane so that it doesn’t just “thuup” into a wave? News flash, the folks doing these jobs in the USN, RN, and IJN (although the Japanese were ahead of the game with a light system rather than LSO’s) had years and years of practice at this and even they made mistakes. And what of the poor pilots? Do you suppose their training included flying their craft to their extremes of range; fighting an action; making their way back to where they think their carrier is going to be; if they’re lucky, finding it; and then trying to land in the dark under lowering skies on a pitching deck with their engines running on fumes? The development of carrier aviation in the "big three" over the years pushed operational limits such as these. Leaders in carrier operations knew that conditions would never be perfect and would probably be the worst imaginable. USN fleet exercises in the 1920s and 30’s often had admirals such as Reeves and King wondering if they’d ever see their planes again as they were sent off on long missions to attack the make-believe "enemy." Even so, non-combat aircraft losses combined with combat operational losses, i.e., aircraft lost through accident not related to combat damage, but on combat missions, were high. For example, in the USN, for the entire war, in the course of some 388,000 plus flights (of which 147,000 plus were combat action sorties) there were 4,863 losses of carrier-based aircraft. 1,877 were directly related to in combat losses, either in combat with enemy aircraft or to enemy AAA; 1,001 were combat operational losses; and 1,985 were non-combat related. Note here that 61.4% of losses did not result from holes being poked in aircraft or pilots. What do you suppose the rates would be for a single operating aircraft carrier whose entire crew and air group has maybe six months experience practicing carrier operations? What do you suppose their losses would be like in just achieving those six months of operational training? And for that matter, once in action, how do you suppose this aircraft carrier is supposed to make up it’s losses when, to be effective and strike the enemy it must operated outside the range of any land-base re-supply or support? Making the comparison a little more manageable, looking again at the USN experience, in calendar year 1942, for all carriers in action, in some 6775 flights, including 2559 action sorties there were 155 combat losses, 63 combat related operational losses, and 66 non- combat flight losses. Statistically, one can take the numbers of carriers in action per month during the period and come up with a composite carrier’s profile of operating numbers: Flights: 2755; action sorties 1043; combat losses: 61; combat operational losses: 26; non-combat related losses: 28; for a total of 115 aircraft lost in a 12 month period. For 1942, that means a US carrier, had it been in action for all 12 months, be it Lexington class, Yorktown class, Ranger or Wasp could have experienced aircraft losses in excess of an entire air group. The USN had the means, flexibility, production and training pipelines, to make up such losses with new planes and replacement pilots. How do you suppose a single German aircraft carrier could continue to operate with those rates of losses? What would be their plan for aircraft replenishment and personnel replacement? Where would the additional trained carrier pilots come from? Was the German navy aware that the majority of aircraft losses would be from flight deck crack-ups, launching failures, and pilots simply getting lost and never seen again? Somehow, I just don’t think so. The Germans had no tactical doctrine for carrier operations, whereas the RN, IJN, and USN had had twenty years to develop, refine, and hone the same. While actual combat led to the out and out abandonment of some cherished carrier operations doctrinal theories, development and adoption of new doctrines (compare the USF-74 of 1941 to USF-74 of 1943 and 1944) went along rather quickly, at least in the USN, largely pushed by squadron commanders and pilots who had seen what had worked and what hadn’t and were in a position to do something about it by virtue if being responsible for the Fleet doctrine re-writes. Germany had no plan that I’m aware of for underway replenishment of flight stores or aircraft. They had no sufficient inventory of replacement aircraft, much less trained carrier pilots. They were apparently not really aware, or at least refused to recognize, of all the pitfalls in developing a carrier arm. This especially obvious in their building/conversion programs; they simply didn’t plan for enough carriers, nor screening vessels. One or two carriers, committed piecemeal, won’t do it. They’d be attacked and sunk, either together or in detail. Much of the sort of thinking about how successful a Kreigsmarine carrier would be, in my opinion, goes along with the “what-if” scenarios where the guys who never did XYZ suddenly have perfect knowledge and are able to pull off XYZ event while the other side is securely tied to their historic ABC position - not to mention a heavy dose of the fan-boys mentality. Operations do not work that way. If Graf Zeppelin had ever ventured out into the Atlantic it would have lasted less time than Bismarck. An untried, unrealistically trained, under strength, and hybrid aircraft equipped air group, with no operational doctrine, flying off an equally untried aircraft carrier, and undoubtedly insufficiently screened (look at Kriegsmarine destroyer losses up through 1941), facing two, three, or even four RN carriers with air groups having all the advantages the Germans would not. If they don’t come out until 1942 maybe even a couple of USN carriers would get into the act as well. Remember all the US CV’s were built on the east coast and did their pre-commissioning and shake down cruises in the Atlantic. They would have the same advantages as the RN (exception being that USN air groups might tend to have a higher percentage of nuggets, but their leadership in squadrons were generally combat experienced or naval aviators with 8 to 10 years experience behind them). This is a no-brainer and in short order the score would be Allies 1 Axis 0.
Part B I think folks tend to give the German’s far too much credit or benefit of the doubt. In this case, I’m sorry, but for all their technology, know-how, and all their supposed skill, it would make absolutely no difference what-so-ever. Here is a ship type they have never before operated. Here is a flight deck operating technique that could only be charitably called “curious.” Here’s a ship that is already a less than optimal design, carrying an insufficiently sized air group. Here are planes that are, perhaps somewhat hastily, modified from land-based types to operate in a carrier-based environment. Here is a command structure where the Kreigsmarine commands the ship and the planes are commanded and flown by the Luftwaffe. (The RN experience of the FAA being part and parcel of the RAF for so many years was ample evidence that that particular arrangement is a logistical disaster looking for a place to happen. Looks like the Germans didn’t get that memo.) And here’s an operating environment that is totally alien to anything done before by the Luftwaffe. Do you really think the good Reich’s Air Marshal Fatty is going to send his best and brightest? I suspect that he, unlike apparently everyone else, already saw the writing on the wall and did as little as possible to encourage the project. To expect either the Kreigsmarine or the Luftwaffe to absorb the lessons of a generation of institutional knowledge in carrier operations as acquired, the hard way, by the RN, USN and IJN, to, in a blinding flash of insight, foresee all the potential problems, I think, is asking a bit too much, even for the Germans. Not that the RN or USN were likely to provide them any short cuts. And do you really think they’d really, I mean, really, listen to the advice from the Japanese . . . remember this is Nazi Germany here. And, yes, I know that two or three KM officers went out on IJN carriers for one or two brief cruises (not into combat) but, I also know that those guys were not pilots and were in Japan for the duration. And folks can talk until they’re blue in the face about how good the Me 109Ts, Fi 167s and the Ju 87Cs were, but, I’m sorry, the 87’s and the 167s would be hopelessly outclassed and the 109s would be in for the fight of their lives. By the time GZ could have put to sea it would probably be late 1942. RN carriers were already carrying F4Fs. The Seafires were coming on line, but suffered throughout the war with severe structural problems resultant from the repeated bruising of carrier landings (see Brown, The Forgotten Fleet or the reports on Operation Meridian in the London Gazette). Gee, do you suppose the Me 109T might suffer the same problem? Not to mention its overall unsatisfactory ergonomics in terms of carrier operations. Its one thing for the German’s to reinforce a design and test it a couple of times; repeated violent exposures are another matter all together. Just how many landings do you think these hybrid aircraft would be able to withstand? Sure would be embarrassing to have them start pulling apart when operating under at-sea combat conditions and not from their nice safe test site landing field. And what about the GZ air group? Some 40 airplanes comprised of, roughly, 10 109s, 13 87s, and 20 167s. The performance statistics for the 109s, on paper, weren’t too bad, but the 87s and the 167s look like a top end of somewhat more than 175 knots … sitting ducks for FM-2s. Only 10 fighters? Oh, please! Let’s see, now that would be 5 to protect the ship and 5 to escort strikes. Anybody in World War II who thought they could adequately defend a carrier with only five fighters or adequately escort a strike with but five fighters was dreaming, desperate or smoking funny cigarettes. The USN and the RN put more fighters that that on their CVEs! And the first time you lose one of these 109Ts, be it a combat or not-combat loss, you’ve cut your fighter strength by 10%; that’s what we call ‘decimate’. Lose another and you’re down 20%, the traditional cut off for unit combat capability. How long do you think that could go on? This genius complement was dreamed up during a time period when fighters on USN fleet carriers were going up from 18 to 28 to 36 as a regular complement. Some would tout that extra planes could be stored triced in the overhead of the hangar deck . . . good idea, look what happened to ALL of the carriers that tried that the first time they took a bomb. What of the pilot training for these fledgling sea eagles? Sure, fighter pilots can fly fighters and dive bomber pilots can dive bomb, and torpedo plane pilots can drop torpedoes or even glide bomb, but how do they get where they need to go and, more importantly how do they get back? I strongly suspect, largely because they never had to, the Germans never thought that one through, either. Navigation over water was, in those days, pretty much a matter of a plotting board, a compass, a clock, watching the waves for wind drift and knowledge of how fast the plane is flying. The FAA, for a long time, held that even fighters had to be two-seaters so that that one fellow could handle the navigation while the other fellow drove the plane. In USN practice, individual pilots did their own navigation; of course, some were better than others. And what was to be the German doctrine? Were individual pilots responsible for their own navigation? Were the fighter pilots to use one of the 87C or 167 pilots as a guide? What if he gets shot down? What was to be their scout doctrine? How many of the, oh, so few, 167s would be delegated for scouting as opposed to strikes? And how were they to find their Point Option (the place where the carrier is supposed to be when a mission is over)? Had they worked all that out? What if the carrier wasn’t where they thought it would be? Did they have a standardized search pattern? Did they have a homing signal system? There are no railroad tracks or roads to follow. There was no “just head east until you see land” method - - - there’d be no land, just miles and miles of an empty ocean. Finally, in the real world, in their only encounter with Luftwaffe fighters, FM pilots (FM’s being a slightly improved F4F) from HMS Searcher’s 882 squadron were credited with 4 Me 109s to one loss (26 March 1945). The 882 pilots were dealing with German fighters that were attacking the strike planes these FMs were escorting - - - i.e., the FMs were on the receiving end of an attack, a decided disadvantage in the fighter world, yet, they seemed to do alright anyway. GZ and its air group were not much better than lambs to the slaughter. The Germans may have dreamed of the GZ doing well as a convoy killer, but the reality would have been that as soon as she had set to sea, the RN carriers would be all over her. If she comes out any time in 1942 or later, then it would be the RN and the USN finishing her off in short order.
