BRITISH ARMY AND THE CLASS SYSTEM AT SINGAPORE./

This is my premise. The British lost Singapore because of the impact of the class system on their fighting ability. Firstly the sheer arrogance of the two capital ships attempting to stop the Japanese landing on the Malay coast is of such an intensity as to practically defy rationality. Did they really think that the Japanese Navy would fold up on the appearance of an elderly battlecruiser and a not particularly powerful battleship? What was going through the heads of the British commanders? One can only conclude that their conceit based on their self belief of natural superiority was so pervasive that they simply could not contemplate that they could be beaten, but beaten they were. Their inability to detach their innate belief that their inclusion in a class of socially superior individuals that happened to be invincible, was because it was in the nature of things that it be so.

The same approach occured in the Army. Officers had the brains, the rest did what they were told to do. It was not possible for soldiers drawn from the underclasses to think for themselves. "Lie down here. Look in thst direction. If you see the enemy tell me. I will tell you when to fire and at what."

Young men were accustomed to do just what they were told. They had little belief in their own abilities and trusted their officrs to lead them to victory by doing that which had to be done.

So when they became separated from their officers in the thick tropical jungle they did not know what they had to do. No one said to do this and do that, just a vast empty void with no-one being in command. And so the Japanese over ran them easily defeating them by means of flexibility, innovation, self belief, independence of thought and finally assertiveness based on a knowledge of being in action( China) under the command of serious tactical thinkers who were also hands on fighters. These leaders developed the importance of senior NCOs and Warrant Officers as being fighting commanders. But the main factor remained the essential need for the average Japanese soldier to think for themselves and be capable of independent and effective tactical approaches to the needs of close quarter fighting.

So Malaya was lost. The British and Australian invidual soldier was no match for a Japanese equivalent.

But then the lesson was learnt. Many years later when I went through the Australian Jungle Training Centre (three times in 5 years!) I learnt the lessons of jungle fighting - think for yourself, the jungle is your friend, superior bushcraft, fighting effectively without direction and so on it was obvious that the average soldier was perfectly capable of fending for himself when alone and isolated in the jungle.

It was the social class apparatus which had to be disbanded and thus allowing empowerment to be given to the British infantry soldier which ensured that as a combat soldier he was, finally, unbeateable.

 

Totally agree with you there Geoff.

The loss of Singapore was the greatest and most humiliating defeat of the British army in my opinion, but there were other causes apart from the rigid blinkered bloody mindedness of old school officers who thought they knew everything. It was just a text book study in incompetence.

The main defences were the guns pointing towards the sea. No strategist considered the possibility of an attack by land from the rear. The Japanese, of course, attacked at this weak point, the rear.

There was a lot of personal feuding between the different services, resulting in poor coordination and bickering. The HQs were all in different places. No civil defence precautions had been taken, so there were no bomb shelters when the air attacks came in. And the air defences were just aging Buffalo "fighters".

A dangerous cocktail of arrogance, ignorance and sloppy organisation.

 

I can't quite see that. I don't think that there would have been much of a change of attitude about fighting in the jungle even 6 months later. Everything would have still been determined by the officers. "Halt. Take up firing positions here. Fire when I give the command etc." There would not have been an acceptance that fighting in the jungle was often a matter of the individual soldier using his initative.
I would imagine that the emphasis would have been on substantial defensive positions.
Assumimg that command still lay with Percival, Gordon Bennett and the rest one could only assume that the infantile bickering and deliberate disinclination to co-operate would have resulted in an unhappy and ineffective high command approach to the task in hand.
More troops on the ground? From where? Would it have made a difference if the experienced Australian Divisions from the Middle East were landed there. Certainly there would be less reliance on the officers for detailed direction on every aspect of a contact with the enemy.
Allied armoured units would be used.
Aircraft quality would be greater. Spitfires would enhance air capability.
But it still wouldn't have mattered.
The Japanese would quickly have achieved air superiority. The Spitfires would have been shot out of the skies by the Zeros as happened at Darwin. What bombers would have been available - Hudsons, Blenheims, Wellingtons presumably. Sitting ducks. Mosquitos perhaps? It would have needed an awful lot of them.The defensive positions would have been subjected to massive and accurate bombing.
JNR would certainly have achieved naval superiority. What could the RN have sent? All five of the KGV class? Five modern carriers? What would have been their task? Deter landings and sink Japanese carriers? With Fulmars, Seafires, Barracudas and Swordfish? The JNR would have torn them apart. What facilities would the RN use? Singapore harbour? Bombed incessantly it would have been a death trap.
The exceptionally long logistic chain would be subject to attack by Japanese submarines.
But there was still this belief that one couldn't fight in the jungle. And this is where the Japanese would triumph. They would have simply bypassed the great defence systems. They would have ambushed the tanks confined to roads or ignored them. With air superiority, short supply chains, naval superiority and an ability and an inclination to fight effectively in the jungle they would have still won. Probably at a higher cost in lives but the result would have been inevitable.

 

The British was always overestimating themselves...at least when the enemy was Asian.
I remember it was mentioned that one of the British generals wasn't impressed with the Japanese military strength near Hong Kong. He called it "not a modern army". And they said they could hold Hong Kong for at least 3 months without reinforcement. Then when the Japanese really attacked, Hong Kong fell in 16? or 18 days. It was a huge slap on their face.

 

You have some significant points there.

There are a lot of imponderables about all of this.

May be the US carriers would have been in harbour at Pearl Harbour.

I couldn't imagine any number of RN carriers would have deterred the IJN. The FAA aircraft were just hopelessly outclassed. HMS Warspite, the R class battleships and Force Z would have just been overwhelmed by the combination of Japanese land based aircraft, IJN torpedo aircraft and dive bombers, not to mention their submarines, never mind their surface battleships.

Look at their record: a large USN carrier, 2 or 3 USS battleships sunk at Pearl Harbour, an RN battleship and battlecruiser, 3 RN heavy cruisers, 1 USN heavy cruiser, 1 Australian light cruiser, several Dutch cruisers and any number of destroyers, sloops etc., all sunk for the loss of one light carrier.

The Buffalos, Vildebeestes, Blenheims, Hurricanes etc would not have stood a chance.

You may be right about Gen. Pownall. Certainly it would have been hoped for that Gordon Benett would have been sent packing. If General Morshead was in command of the Australian 7th, 8th and 9th Divisions then perhaps the infantry would have fought to the end which ever way it went. But it is unavoidable to think otherwise that the RN and RAF/RAAF would have stood a chance,

 

It took the Japanese just 18 days to defeat the British forces in Hong Kong. But then, the British were outnumbered nearly four to one. The British had 14,000 soldiers in HK (of which 2,000 were from Canada and another 4,000 from India), while the invaders had 52,000. Casualties were nearly even. Around 2,000 each died on both sides.

 

During the First World War, the Germans held their colony in China ( Qingdao ) for months against the Japanese. They had only 4,500 men and were short on supplies because it was about time for the (annual) resupply ship to arrive. Japanese attacked with at least 30,000 men and fleet of warships. The Germans were completely cut off with no hope of getting reinforcement or supplies. They still did well and they had to surrender when their ammunition ran out.

So the outnumbered 4 to 1 wasn't a good excuse for the British to lost Hong Kong in just 18 days. They were totally underestimating the Japanese and they were totally unprepared for a real war in Far East.

 

QUOTE:
"The vast majority of the troops defending Malaya were Indian and brand new recruits at that. Following orders is what is done in the army and even experienced troops will be placed in defensive positions and given orders about what to do, the army is not a free for all where you go where you want, when you want and shoot when you want.

Also all this Jungle stuff is a myth! the Malayan campaign was fought along the finest road network in South East Asia, nearly every action was conducted within a few hundred meters of a road and usually in plantations or very light jungle terrain. Very little "close jungle fighting" actually took place. When it did, such as at Kampar the Japanese were often fought to a standstill and suffered heavy casualties. UNQUOTE"

 

As an infantry platoon commander in an Army that was pretty much totally committed to fighting jungle warfare and who served in South Vietnam for one years war service (admittedly not as a platoon commander for some of that time, ops officer psyops) it could be seen that invidual soldiers in their little sub groups fought as they were trained ie to operate effectively without the constant direction of commissioned officers.
In fact action in the jungles of Vietnam were, usually, a free for all, with sections going where they wanted, when they wanted and shooting when they wanted - but all within a central plan dictated by the officer. There wasn't the time for the platoon commander to control individual activities of soldiers or their sections. Everyone knew what to do and had been trained, exhaustively so, to operate as separate combat entities. The pl commander would give a foundation for the coming action to be based upon and the sections then operated accordingly. Obviously the pl commander would adjust priorities or give new orders based on the to and fro of the action, but the soldiers needed no constant direction.

Let me give an example of what this topic is all about. In 1972 a company of a famous Scottish Regiment, based in Hong Kong came to Townsville in North Queensland to spend a fortnight or so working with Australian infantry units. After about a week or so the whole exercise had to be called off. These Scottish soldiers were hopelessly unsuited to jungle fighting and in fact even just surviving in the harsh environment was beyond them. I an sure that they were personally brave beyond calculation but they simply had no idea of how to look after themselves in the field. They were totally dependent upon their officers. This was the behavior displayed by British and Australian troops in Malaysia. However the Australians faced up to the problem, established amongst other actions the large Jungle Training Centre at Canungra. The JTC had two primary roles; one to train soldiers in jungle fighting and two, to assess battalions as to whether they were suitable to go overseas in to a war environment. Part of their approach was to apply such stress on the officers as to see whether they broke under the strain and believe me the stress was crushing. In our battalion a company commander was removed from his command, his career ruined and a platoon commander was also removed.
Whether the British Army in Burma eventually also got on top of the problem I don't know but it is perhaps significant that a program was initiated where a hundred or so of Australian platoon comanders were being recruited to be transferred to the British Army in Burma.
As to the comment that most fighting in Malaya did not actually take place in the jungle, from my observations most infantry action in Malaya did take place in jungle, whether near roads or not and this was where the Japanesed excelled. By bypassing strongpoints, outflanking defensive positions and isolating individual sub units they fought a practiced, fast, luid and relentless manner of imaginative warfare that ensured an easy victory.
Again I make my point. The class system was such that it was believed that only officers had the brains, character and natural superiority for command and as such they had to dictate to the troops what to do, in detail. The troops were considered to be too dumb, their natural lot in life to be doing as they were ordered in specific detail and this was not conducive to achieve military success in Malayas jungles.

 

No, it really only applied in jungle where no one could hardly see another and as a result officers were detached from exercising immediate control of their troops.
I must admit that your approach of just having to agree to disagree is very sensible as it is just becoming repetitive and who knows perhaps you are right. I'll let it go.

 

You raise an issue which interests me and which may interest others. I have read much about Churchill over the years and it seems that he was ... well I was going to list all of his qualities but we know them all and we also know his shortcomings so I will get straight to the point which is this - when he was being irrational, just how irrational was he?

I recall a story where shortly before D Day he panicked and insisted that all planning for the invasion be cancelled and that the landings were to take place in Portugal.

At another time he spoke about the presence of a KGV battleship in Malayan waters in a most pronounced flowery manner, conjuring up images of a great, grey, ghost of a ship slipping in and out of view, demoralising the Japanese with its elusive menace.

He once said that he considered resigning and going out to the middle east to take personal command and in that way achieve the victory which he considered to be possible.

This sort of impractical nonsense would surely indicate that he was seriously delusional but as he was so capable in so many other aspects is it the case that it could just have been the alcohol speaking or was it that he had a quirk of temperment that took over on occasions and just as quickly passed? Was he experiencing early stages of dementia? I would not think that anyone could drink as much booze as he did at his age and not be affected by it.

Was his irrationality apparent to the British at the time of the election that he lost and was this why they voted him out?