It's a known fact that the Brits informed the Americans that the Japanese were planning an attack on Pearl Harbor. They came by this information with the help of one of their double agents. Do you think the attack was due to incompetence, ignorance or just plain underestimation of the enemy? Could it have been avoided?
I'm not sure that's a fact, but if it is, I think it is akin to all the intelligence we have now regarding potential terrorist attacks. How can we know which lead to follow with so many possible enemies in so many places? It's fun to play with conspiracy theories but I don't think much truth comes out of the exercise. Could the attack on Pearl Harbor have been avoided? I'm doubtful.
Not a fact. This is just Pearl Harbor Conspiracy Industry repeat it until everyone believes it nonsense. There is absolutely no evidence that the British had any foreknowledge of the Japanese plans, QED they could not fail to warn the Americans of something they did not know.
I have read some about the various factions within Japan at that time. The foreign ministry had their own plans, as did the army, as did the navy. They rarely communicated or coordinated anything. I imagine it was really difficult, even if the British had such information, for them to know if the alleged Pearl Harbor attack was really going to happen, or was just the fantastic imagining of some desk-bound Tokyo junior bureaucrat.
Strange that the UK knew about Pearl Harbor but never knew about the Japanese attack plans for Malaya? I agree, utter rubbish. Could Pearl Harbor have been avoided? of course it could, if you use hindsight? The attack on Pearl Harbor was brave, auditious, and very cunning. You need to look at Japanese success as well as US failure.
There were so many different information out there about Pearl Harbor. Some of the information I read had stated that the U.S. government knew a Japanese attack would take place, they just didn't know where. When they got the intel on the troops movement of Japanese forces, they thought they were headed to southeast Asia. Well, Japan indeed went on rampage in southeast Asia (because of the U.S. oil embargo... they had no fuel left to continue the war in China if they don't take the oil fields down there), but in order to do so they had to disable U.S. pacific fleet to get rid of the only threat in the region. I guess the U.S. government had thought of it but they probably underestimated Japan like the British did. (the British claimed they could hold Hong Kong for 3 months without reinforcement...then lost it in 16? 18? days).
I agree with what vashstampede said. The Americans knew that Japan is planning an attack and they just didn't know where. The Americans also didn't expect that the Japanese could pull off an attack like that. They are thinking that with Hawaii's strategic location and its long distance from mainland China, an aerial attack would not be possible. I think that the Americans, with their superior power didn't think that an Asian country such as Japan would have the power to deal a blow large enough that it would stop their entire Pacific fleet.
Yeah, so if you call it "ignorance", it is an ignorance of the Japanese capability. In the last a few centuries, Asian countries fell behind in technologies. No European country had been defeated by an Asian country on large scale war before. So no European countries took Asians seriously and always thought Asian armies were inferior. Underestimating of Japanese capability was the type of "ignorance" which caused the heavy blow to the allies during the early stage of Pacific War. Japan did a good job on rapid modernization since 1870s. They were in a closed state just like China was, but it took them just two to three decades to have the capability not only defeated China who had the 6th largest fleet in the world at the time of The First Sino-Japanese War, but also later defeated Russia which is a European country. That somehow still didn't make the rest of the European countries pay attention.
I think that in 1941 President Roosevelt and top officials knew and indeed would welcome American involvement in the war in Europe and the Far East.Consider the question from an economic perspective.America had been hit hard in the Great Depression,and the country was stalled economically.Participation in the war would jump start the economy,with industries working,eventually, at full capacity,overseas exports skyrocketing,and of course full employment in the civilian workforce.Financially,America would be able to turn her own financial sector around And offer loans to friendly belligerent nations that could be called in for future favors.From a political perspective an "attack" by an "Axis" ally would serve several purposes.First it would give America a plausible pretext to join the conflict.Second,it would silence the Isolationists and rally the country around a cause(combatting japanese imperialism and nazi aggression etc).Third,President Roosevelt,would benefit immensely,politically,by being the war leader who lifted the nation out of the depression,silenced those political opponents who called for inaction,and led the country to victory over the tyranny of facism.Fourth,there were many,at the top,notably General George C Marshall, Chief of the JCS,who believed that America should and must claim her place as an international superpower.Fourth,it had been accepted from the early 1930's that a showdown with Imperial Japan was inevitable (who would provide the pretext was the question).I do not believe that there was any doubt in Washington as to the outcome of the war.Admiral Yammato,had travelled extensively in America in the 30's and warned the militarists that Japan would have roughly a year to run amok,but after that,the balance of power would shift decisively and irrevocably to the Americans.Pearl would be and was in fact a minor tactical setback for America,but a golden opportunity for the country.While it may seem callous of Washington to dispose of the fate of american servicemen in such a fashion,I believe that the Pearl Harbor attack was a necessary prerequisite to America entering the war and fulfilling a grand strategic agenda that looked far beyond defeating the axis powers. Richard
One of the regrets of historical research is now and then you come across a fascinating story that you cannot shoehorn into the narrative you are constructing, which in this case was my novel The Great Liars, which went up this week on Amazon and Kindle. Peter Shepherd, who was an 18-year-old Royal Air Force mechanic stationed in Malaya in 1941 as the war clouds darkened. He waited nearly sixty years to tell his story because, as he wrote in Three Days to Pearl (Naval Institute Press, 2000), to do so earlier “may have stirred up enduring ill will between Great Britain and the United States.” I came across Shepherd’s account in the course of years of research into the period leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, an event that saw the U.S. enter the war against Germany before it was too late to do any good. Hitler’s legions had conquered most of Europe with its new Blitzkrieg style of war, and Britain was beginning to starve from the noose U-boats were tightening around shipping. Some in the ruling class believed the country could only be saved by a new government willing to negotiate a dishonorable peace after Winston Churchill was removed from power and King George forced to abdicate in favor of his older brother, the former king now the Duke of Windsor, whose pro-German sympathies were known to intelligence services on both sides of the Atlantic. Shepherd, who had joined the RAF when only fifteen, arrived in Singapore in August of 1941 in a convoy of troop ships. “I at last experienced a sense of having left the war behind, its perils, and its many depressing restrictions, far behind.” A callow youth still, ignorant and unformed, he regarded the Japanese as “polite, humble, chivalrous, and honorable people who revered their ancestors, worshipped the emperor, and loved simple, exquisite things such as cherry blossoms and chrysanthemums.” Then he picked up a magazine one day and read about Japan’s brutal war in China and its aggressive intentions toward the Far East. “I didn’t get it.” The British badly underestimated the Japanese; a corporal summed it up for Shepherd when ominous troop movements were reported. “Well, I can tell you this much—they won’t get very bloody far. They wouldn’t dare start anything against the British out here; we’d slam them back to Tokyo in five minutes. Who the hell are they anyway? Just a tribe of vacant faced bastards. Plus they all wear glasses. Cheeky sods!” Shepherd was ordered to accompany a civilian pilot with a Dutch accent on a secret night mission to French Indo-China, nominally controlled by the Vichy government but already under the thumb of the Japanese army. While the pilot left to take care of business he didn’t explain, Shepherd loitered in a restaurant until time to fly back to Malaya. He met a Japanese engineer without a word of English who rapidly got drunk on cognac and became expansive. He was bursting with a secret so large he could not contain it even if he had to resort to hand gestures and a hand-drawn map. Shepherd learned he had been part of a crew of civilians who adapted bomb racks for torpedoes rigged for shallow running. The torpedoes and the aircraft that would deliver them were aboard six carriers that would attack “Purhabba,” Singapore and Malaya would be struck at the same time. “I smiled, frowned, and shook my head as in disbelief,” Shepherd wrote, “though inwardly I had felt the sickening clutch of fear.” As the Japanese engineer got sick over the veranda rail, Shepherd stole the hand-drawn map and departed. Back in Malaya, he was told to report the conversation to a squadron commander he had never met before, and they were immediately flown to Kuala Lumpur to brief two civilians; he assumed all three were in intelligence. Doing the calculations in his head, Shepherd told them he thought the attack on Pearl Harbor would be three days hence, on Sunday, December 7. The meeting ended, Shepherd having been ordered not to repeat his story to anyone. Back at the airstrip, he and the other mechanics were worked to the point of exhaustion getting Blenheim bombers ready for action; one collapsed from overwork and was carried off and another couldn’t rise from a chair when he sat down. Just before sinking into sleep when at last off duty, Shepherd wrote, he felt a premonition. “Earthshaking events, evil and unspeakable, were about to erupt.” He woke to falling bombs and then the building blew up around him. He was in hospitals for two years. After the war, he became a chartered engineer, retiring to West Sussex in 1988. What Shepherd could not know was evidence has been unearthed in the past fifteen or so years was Washington, D.C., knew the Japanese Imperial Fleet was en route to attack the Pacific Fleet. But that’s another story you will find at http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00IEM9TKI#r...
Can one presume you have some documentation, other than some fevered Pearl Harbor Conspiracy’s website, which supports your, ummm, theory? Here’s the deal, it you cannot get simple historical facts straight, then your entire contention is called into doubt, to wit: “ . . .there were many,at the top,notably General George C Marshall, Chief of the JCS,who believed that America should and must claim her place as an international superpower.” And we can presume you have some sort of statement made by George C. Marshall to this effect? A quote? A document? Some evidence that would have us all conclude that this was his belief and thus desire for US entry into the war? Something from before the US entry into war? George C. Marshall was not, and never was “Chief of the JCS” as you seem to want to claim. George C. Marshall was Chief of Staff of the United State Army, that is, the ranking officer of the US Army. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were an outgrowth of the ARCADIA conference (which started on 22 December and ended on 14 January 1942, by the way) and the first meeting of the, formal title, Joint US Chiefs of Staff was on 9 February 1942. You may wish to note that these dates are all after the entry of the US into the war. The original membership was Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark; the Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, Admiral Ernest King; Chief of Staff of the US Army, General George Marshall, and the Chief of the US Army Air Forces and Deputy US Army Chief of Staff for Air, Lieutenant General Henry Arnold. As a result of perhaps a less than stellar performance as the CNO, Admiral Starke was shunted off to a command in Britain in March. Admiral King became both the CNO and CinCUSFlt. In order to keep a balance amongst services, retired and former CNO, Admiral William Leahy, was brought back to the US from his duty as ambassador to Vichy France and returned to active duty. He was appointed as the military chief of staff to President Roosevelt and served, and this is military custom, since his date of rank as Admiral preceded the dates of rank of both Marshall and King, as the chairman of the Joint US Chiefs when they met. This was not an appointment, it was and is simply the way things are done in the US services . . . absent a specific appointment, the senior officer present presides. Admiral Leahy occupied this chair through the end of the war into the postwar Truman administration. George Marshall, then, contrary to your presentation was never, ever, chief of the US JCS and that organization did not exist until after the US entered the war. So, a simple, easy to check, fact of which, if you were indeed in touch with your thesis you would have known. This misrepresentation of fact and the basic failure to present any evidence whatsoever calls your entire theory into question. Being generous, you get a good solid D- on your thesis, but mostly for taking the effort to write, not for any solid presentation of fact. Suggest more research and less breathless and unsubstantiated accusations . . . perhaps, for better reception, you might wish to confine yourself to a forum supporting Illuminati Conspiracy.
You have confused me with the person who made the assertion about General Marshall. I have read a good many of the relevant biographies and autobiographies of the politicians, generals, admirals, and diplomats who ran the show here and across the Pacific and Atlantic in the years, weeks and months leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I am particularly indebted to Robert Stinnett, a Navy veteran of WW2 who pursued the facts wherever they led him. He combed through 200,ooo records and documents, and interviewed many people in the course of researching The Day of Deceit. Many of them had remained classified a half century later after the events, and he gained access to them through FOI requests. Many thousands more remain yellowing or falling to dust in archives. You have to read his book to get the full import, and inexpensive copies are available from Amazon and other on-line sources. It is somewhat dry in places, but well worth the effort. Among the points he made: The Office of Naval Intelligence had been studying Japanese codes since the 1920s, and by 1940 had solved its diplomatic code (Purple) and four of its 29 naval codes. It was collecting radio traffic from listening stations along the rim of the Pacific and reading messages back and forth from Tokyo to Admiral Yamamoto almost as soon as he was. It intercepted, decoded and translated his order to the Imperial Japanese Fleet on November 24 ordering the task force that had been assembled (the ONI knew about this as it happened) to attack and destroy the Pacific Fleet on December 7 unless instructed otherwise. The exact wording of the order was known and sent to Washington, D.C, from Station HYPO, located in the cellar of the administrative building of the Fourteenth Naval District in Pearl Harbor. Having been mysteriously cut out of the intelligence loop with General Short in April of 1941, Admiral Kimmel was not privy to this. He in fact could not have gained access to the super secret center despite his rank as commander of the Pacific Fleet. Both the FBI and ONI were aware of the arrival in Honolulu in early 1941 of a 27-year-old Japanese naval officer named Tadashi Marimura (real name Takeo Yoshikawa), sent to replace a consular official unacquainted with navy matters who was sending wrong information about ships to Tokyo. A tap was put on Marimura's telephone and his cables to Tokyo sent via commercial companies were read (it was illegal but we did anyhow). In the early days of December, Marimura sent bomb plot information about which Navy ships were berthed where. This was known to the White House but not reported to Kimmel. Kimmel was confused about why he wasn't receiving intelligenceas before, but he was no dummy. Twice he sent task forces, one commanded by Bull Halsey, north to see what could be found. One went directly to the sea mount where Yamamoto launched his planes. Twice he was ordered to return the ships to Pearl Harbor. The second time it was hinted a court martial would be forthcoming if he continued to do this. Well, that's enough for now. I'm looking forward to your response. And, yes, The Great Liars is fiction, but the facts aren't.
No, I have not confused you at all, you've written a novel, which whilst you attempt to entice us to buy, otherwise why would you indulge in marketing, is by your own admission, a novel, i.e., Fiction. You may be indebted to Mr Stinnett, but he has been thoroughly discredited . . . and his being a WW2 veteran does not give him a horse in the race, so were a couple of million others, his being a veteran does not give a cache in his, frankly, nonsensical presentation. And, yes, I have read Stinnett, falls under the general category of knowing the enemy. Stinnett did not know squat about code breaking. Those who were in the business at the time, and those who had or have actually bothered to check, who have debunked his presentation. So, you show us: Who knew the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor . . . specifically, name names . . .? How did they know, who told them? How did that person, or persons, and again provide names, find out? Be specific. Oh, and your statements regarding Kimmel sending Halsey & anyone else to find or intercept the Japanese or his access to the take from Station Hypo are Pearl Harbor Conspiracy nonsense the flies in the face of history. You are spouting the junk produced by an entire cottage industry that has never been able to produce a single shred of evidence. The modus operandi is to continually quote and cite each other and avoid the real historical record at all costs. You wrote: "It intercepted, decoded and translated his order to the Imperial Japanese Fleet on November 24 ordering the task force that had been assembled (the ONI knew about this as it happened) to attack and destroy the Pacific Fleet on December 7 unless instructed otherwise. The exact wording of the order was known and sent to Washington, D.C, from Station HYPO, located in the cellar of the administrative building of the Fourteenth Naval District in Pearl Harbor. Having been mysteriously cut out of the intelligence loop with General Short in April of 1941, Admiral Kimmel was not privy to this." Prove it.
No hostility, a well known figure of speech. Just to show you what a nice man I am, though, I'll rephrase . . . try " . . . to know what the latest Pearl Harbor Conspiracy nut is writing." I have a well known lack of tolerance to nonsense . . . in the case of the PHC industry there is nothing but a lot of smoke, mirrors, inaccuracies, out right lies, continued repetition of the preceding, and never a single solitary shred of proof, not one . . . never a single remorse-filled participant in any of these conspiracies, and there would have have to been thousands involve to make it work, lying on his death bed confessing . . . "yes, I was in on it". No proof, no evidence, no confessions, no smoking gun, no case.
It is the actual attack on Pearl Harbour that would get the US into the war, not the number of ships sunk or servicemen killed. If the white house knew about the attack and when it was to take place then one simple thing would have happened, they would have ensured that the harbour was cleared (even if to maintain secrecy it meant leaving harbour under cover of darkness on 6th Dec) and the air defences put in a state of readiness. I agree with R Leonard, it's all utter rubbish.
Stinnett, been interviewed by Antiwar Radio : But I have a good doubt, whether its a self promotion for his book ... Day of Deceit ... or it was a simple propaganda !
R. Leonard: You are a master of bombast, I'll give you that. I believe your emotional investment in the official history of Pearl Harbor just might render you incapable of absorbing any new information on the subject. I'm not sure how well known your intolerance to nonsense is, never having heard of you before now, but your bluster about "inaccuracies, out right lies, continued repetition of the preceding" and so forth is merely abuse that no reasonable person would confuse with effective argument. Robert Stinnett in his Day of Deceit marshals a very persuasive case that naval intelligence had broken not only the Japanese Purple diplomatic code, but was reading naval codes. "Never a single shred of truth," you write with what I think is probably customary exaggeration and willful disregard of the truth if it doesn't suit you. If you have read Stinnett's book, and others like it, you will find it densely packed with verifiable facts that are further elaborated on in scores of footnotes. This might not rise to the level of "facts" or "proof" for someone who evidently has anger management issues, but it will serve for the rest of us. There were not "thousands" of people in on the denial of intelligence to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, only a few. As a side thought, what is your explanation for at a time of highest alert General Marshall could not be reached the night before the attack or the following morning when he took a long canter on his horse? And then when at last he came into the office, he took his time reading as an aide kept pointing to the deadline in the 14th part of the declaration of war by Japan. When finally finished, instead of picking up the scrambler phone on his desk and issuing an urgent warning to Pearl Harbor, he sent it by commercial telegram.This is strange behavior by any definition. As for how the lid was kept on, I refer you to Benghazi. The people involved have been ordered under pain of severe punishment not to talk about it, even to Congress. They are required to take monthly lie detector tests to insure compliance. You are probably humorless in addition to the other qualities I have alluded to, so I cannot recommend that you read: http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_s...the great liars&sprefix=the great lia,aps,368