Ought Great Britain have sought an armistice with Germany in June 1940?

Britain may have justified her involvement in the war by claiming she was protecting the rights of ‘Brave little Belgium’, but she was, in fact, fighting to keep the English Channel, North Sea and Atlantic clear of an enemy power’s warships, and the threat that such an enemy navy would pose to British Empire trade.




By embroiling herself in a continental land conflict that raged for four years and consumed huge amounts of manpower and financial reserves, Britain went against a policy that had served her well for two hundred years.

A decision to go to war in 1914 was by no means a foregone conclusion. Britain’s ‘understanding’ with France and the 1839 Treaty of London, guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, bound her no more than did her pledge to defend Poland against the Red Army twenty five years later.

The cabinet was strongly divided as to whether to declare war on Germany as late as 1st August 1914 - indeed Sir Edward Grey actually told the French Ambassador not to count on British help - but eventually the ‘hawks’ - a leading member of whom was none other than Winston Churchill - of whom much more later - gained the ascendancy and war was formally declared on the 4th.

Britain entered into a landlocked war of attrition against a foe fielding 1,400,000 trained troops armed with the world’s strongest navy and an expeditionary force of only six divisions.

There is no space here to describe the events of the next four years, we all know the result.

I should point out that I am distinctly of the Gary Sheffield camp as far as British military performance is concerned and that I further believe it was the British and French armies that won the First World War, along with the threat posed to Germany’s battered army by the imminent prospect of American intervention in overwhelming numbers, rather than any actual American military involvement.

 

What interests me here - and a point that seems to me to be of salient foreshadowing for the following conflict - is America’s behaviour regarding her entry into the war, or rather her not entering the war until such a late stage in the proceedings.

America was, over the course of much of the Great War, at best ambivalent to it’s outcome.

The War was a European affair, which was happening a long way away, and which barely affected the average American citizen, if it affected them at all.

In fact, the War was assisting American interests, in that it progressively weakened at least two of America’s main economic rivals, and at the same time provided a useful means for American industry to increase its means of production and find a ready and willing market for its goods.

In effect, staying out of the War suited America as much as it would have suited the British, except that the distances and lack of threat involved made it far more simple for America not to get sucked into the melee.

Woodrow Wilson, elected President in 1913 and re-elected ( just ) in 1916, was firmly against American intervention in the Great War and refused to build up the strength of the American forces on the pretext that any such build up would provoke war.

He attempted a mediation between the warring European powers in 1916, but neither side took him seriously.

There were several occasions where acts by the belligerent nations may have induced a different President to consider war, but Wilson continued to keep America out.

Indeed, he used this as his platform and slogan during the election of 1916, but with four more years of Presidency ahead of him, he found himself in the position of his hand being forced by public outrage at the German use of unrestricted submarine warfare, and he therefore proceeded to lead America to war in April 1917 ‘ in order to make the world safe for democracy’.

America did not become an ‘ally’ of the Entente Powers, but instead fought as an ‘associated power’.

Hmmm.


Wilson enunciated America’s war aims in his famous fourteen points, which basically boiled down to free trade, open agreements between nations, freedom of the seas, democracy for all peoples and ( crucially ) self determination for all peoples.

The victorious Entente nations weren’t exactly impressed by the trite suggestions Wilson laid out, but with a number of quite serious ( and justified ) reservations, allowed the points to be used as a basis for the forthcoming Treaty of Versailles.

Britain ( understandably ) didn’t like the freedom of the seas clause and none of the remaining Entente powers felt like letting Germany off the hook in regard to who was responsible for the war, nor on who ought to pay for it.

Germany was forced to agree to pay enormous war reparations ( although they were never collected )

The Entente powers, all of whom were essentially Imperial powers, with colonies and dominions in various parts of the globe, looked suspiciously on the call for the self determination of peoples as being more than slightly anti - imperialist.

Rightly so.

 

One of Wilson’s Fourteen Points suggested the establishment of a ‘League of Nations’ , a body intended to resolve international conflicts without resort to war, which was established at the Paris Peace Conference.

America declined to join.

Chamberlain, of course, was more than aware of the events of 1914 - 1918, and depressingly aware of the longer term effect of the eventual demise of the Anglo- Japanese alliance in 1923, ( in my opinion a disastrous error of judgement - trading an alliance with a known and proven ally in order to curry favour with a nation known to be at most luke-warm towards British interests ) - especially when combined with the limitations on the tonnage of fleets imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 - both of which seriously undermined the ability of the Royal Navy to provide adequate security for Imperial holdings in the Far East whilst simultaneously maintaining suitable level defence in Home waters and the Mediterranean.

He allowed Munich to appear like appeasement.

He was buying time.

He knew that the state of unpreparedness for war that the UK currently found itself in would soon change.

On February 22nd 1939 Chamberlain said;

‘During the past two days, we have discussed the progress of our arms build up. The figures are indeed overwhelming, perhaps even to such an extent that the people are no longer able to even comprehend them....Ships, cannons, planes and ammunition are now pouring out of our dockyards and factories in an ever increasing torrent...’

I would therefore suggest that Chamberlain knew that in the spring and early summer of 1939, the military situation in Europe still favoured Germany, a fact driven further home by the announcement of the Molotov - Ribbentrop pact in August.

And Chamberlain was still buying time, holding back from committing British soldiers to another Great War until he knew that Britain would hold the upper hand.

Better still, he knew that a German invasion of Poland would reduce the power of the Nazi forces available to strike at the UK.

He was getting the Poles to do the fighting for him.

He knew he had absolutely no intention of helping Poland.


I would submit that Chamberlain deliberately, coldly, and without hesitation, threw Poland to the wolves, in order to buy time for the UK to introduce its new weapons systems and establish a buffer zone between Germany and the UK by aiding the French establish a stop line running from the Maginot Line to the Belgian coast.

It worked.

From the fall of Poland on October 6th 1939 until the Norwegian Campaign, - which seems to have been the result of both sides simultaneously realising the extreme benefit of occupying Denmark and Norway, and, equally suddenly, deciding to do something about it - the less than effective allied operation being largely the brainchild of Paul Reynaud and that master of amphibious landings, Winston Churchill - with the Germans beating the Allies to the post in what was more or less a photo finish - and losing a much higher proportional loss in shipping compared to the Royal Navy - which itself lost an aircraft carrier due to what can only be described as appalling command decisions on the ‘Glorious’ and despite the suicidal bravery of the two screening destroyers in attacking the German battlecruisers ‘Scharnhorst’and ‘Gneisenau’ with repeated torpedo attacks - British troops barely even saw a German, never mind go into action against them.


Which, again, suited what I perceive as Chamberlain’s plan to remain distanced from outright warfare with the German Army until the UK’s build up was complete.

Somehow, the Narvik failure rebounded on Chamberlain. Admiral Keyes and Leo Amery ( father of the notorious traitor, John Amery, hanged in 1945 ) both speaking vehemently against Chamberlain in the House - yet made no critical reference to Churchill’s involvement.

Chamberlain, after deciding he would resign after losing the support of the Labour Party under Clement Attlee, handed over as Prime Minister to Winston Churchill, despite having personally preferred Halifax as his successor.

He was not alone in preferring Halifax - Lord Beaverbrook memorably said;

‘Chamberlain wanted Halifax. Labour wanted Halifax. Sinclair wanted Halifax. The Lords wanted Halifax. The King wanted Halifax.’

I would suggest that Halifax was, in fact, the man for the job.

But the British got Churchill.

 

Of course, the May 1940 ‘Blitzkreig’ , with the Germans feinting through the Low Countries and drawing the cream of the Allied forces north into the trap, before unleashing their main offensive through the relatively weakly defended Ardennes and cutting the BEF, the Belgian Army and the cream of the French Army off from the bulk of the French forces.

It is my submission that the Battle of France was not lost because the Allies had inferior equipment ( the French Somua S35 and Hotchkiss H35 tanks disabling 130 German tanks at the Battle of Hannut, although many German tanks were repaired after the French withdrew from the battlefield and the British Matilda proving to be immune to the guns of the German Panzer II and Panzer 38 (t) and also to the standard 37mm PaK ) although the French, Belgian and Dutch airforces fielded large numbers of obsolete aircraft - newer types being only weeks away from being deployed, or only available in penny packets - the RAF could meet the Luftwaffe on near equal terms, with the notable exception of the Fairy Battle light bomber ), but because of the very poor high level leadership and understanding of the notion of all arms co-ordination so eloquently applied by the Germans in their campaign.

In the defeat that followed, much of the carefully built up equipment was abandoned or destroyed in place as the BEF evacuated from Dunkirk starting from the 26th May with similar losses of equipment taking place as Operations Ariel and Cycle rescued the 2nd BEF from the western French ports between 15th and 25th June.

The French signed an armistice with the Germans on the 22nd, which came into effect at 01.35 on the 25th.

Which brings us to the situation as it stood on 25nd June, 1940.


To be continued in my next post.

 

EDIT TO PREVIOUS POST

First Paragraph should read

Of course, the May 1940 ‘Blitzkreig’ , with the Germans feinting through the Low Countries and drawing the cream of the Allied forces north into the trap, before unleashing their main offensive through the relatively weakly defended Ardennes and cutting the BEF, the Belgian Army and the cream of the French Army off from the bulk of the French forces, came as a nasty shock to the British.

 

I think it is time to review and question the intentions of the National Socialist regime - by which I essentially mean the intentions of Adolf Hitler.

‘...the English nation will have to be considered the most valuable ally in the world....’

Mein Kampf

‘I feel a deep disgust for this type of unscrupulous politician who wrecks whole nations,I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal since I am not the vanquished begging favors, but the victor speaking in the name of reason.’

Speech to the Reichstag July 1940, regarding Churchill




‘He then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilisation that Britain had brought into the world ...
He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church — saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany's position on the continent.
The return of Germany's lost colonies would be desirable, but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops, if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere.
He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain, on a basis that she would regard compatible with her honour to accept.’

Quoted in ‘On the Other Side of the Hill’ as relayed by von Runstedt

‘We Germans have had sufficient experience to know how hard it is to coerce England. And apart from all this, I as a German would rather see India under British domination than under that of any other nation’
Mein Kampf

‘I mentioned England and Italy as the only countries with which it would be worthwhile for us to strive to form a close alliance and that this alliance would be advantageous’
Mein Kampf

‘The English are our brothers, why should we fight against our brothers?’
In conversation with Albert Speer, 1940

The list goes on and on - although I am of the opinion that many of Hitler’s admiring words for the British Empire were based on his ( incorrect ) perception of the ‘strong’ way the ‘Aryan’ British maintained power over their ‘Non - Aryan’ colonial subjects, proving to him the dominance of the Nordic peoples over ‘lesser’ races.

I believe Hitler admired and respected the British Empire immensely - although without either truly understanding the ethic behind the Empire, nor the structure of British society.

His understanding was basically racially coloured - no pun intended - but whatever his understanding, he clearly did not want to be fighting the British, nor did he have designs on any part of the British Empire - with the possible exception of Iraq.

I believe Hitler realised intuitively in 1940 - that which the Kaiser did not, in 1914 - that Germany was, and always had been, an essentially land orientated power, and that Britain was essentially a sea based power.

He was not interested in the Mediterranean, he was not interested in the Atlantic, he was not interested in far flung colonial empire,he was interested in the dual goal of defeating Communism, which he equated with at least one half of world Jewry and creating a land based, self sufficient, racially ‘pure’ empire in the East.

In return, he could see that the British had no real interest in the continent and, historically had not had such since the 1500’s.

As such, Hitler saw no conflict of interest between British and German co-existence.

I am fully aware of the so-called ‘Black List’ of potential arrestees, of the proposed removal of man-power to act as slave labour in Germany, of the true and real nature of the Nazi regime’s methods in governing their conquered allies - but I do not think Hitler was ever serious about invading England - to him, the Battle of Britain was merely designed to destroy a potential British threat to his rear.

I think these ‘plans’ can be disregarded as a kind of fanciful doodling - similar to a poor man dreaming on what he would spend a lottery win if all his numbers were to come up.

I believe Hitler simply was waiting in June 1940 for the British to realise that there was no point in continuing the war - not because he thought they could be defeated - I don’t think ‘SeeLowe’ was ever seriously contemplated by Hitler himself - although his military commanders may have thought otherwise - and he simply could not understand why the British could not see what to him was an obvious and logical conclusion regarding a cessation of hostilities between the two nations.

 

That the British did not - in Hitler’s view, at least - ‘see sense’ and call for an armistice is, in my opinion, largely down to the influence and rhetoric of one man.

That man was Winston S Churchill.

Let me make one thing perfectly clear about my opinions and bias regarding Churchill.

I believe that, faced with the inevitability of a prolonged and arduous conflict with Germany, Churchill was the very embodiment of the type of inspirational, courageous, dynamic leader the British needed in order to stay the course.

I am not sure, however, that Britain was, in June 1940, in fact, facing an inevitable, prolonged and arduous conflict with Germany.

As such, I do not necessarily believe that Churchill was the right man, in the right place, at the right time.

The above statements are in no way intended to denigrate Churchill’s contribution to the eventual defeat of Hitler, once the decision had been made to continue the war, nor to slur his character as a true patriot.

I do, however, believe that Churchill was mistaken in many of his beliefs and actions.

I also believe he was mentally ill.

For those unfamiliar with the term Bipolar Disorder, it is a condition whereby the affected person experiences major mood swings - extended episodes of extreme depression, during which time the sufferer may experience intense feelings of sadness, low self esteem and, possibly, suicidal thoughts, followed by extended periods of mania, when the sufferer feels capable of planning and executing highly ambitious plans, exhibits extreme confidence and self belief - although poor sleep patterns, belligerence towards and quick irritation with the ‘slowness’ of others are also indicators of a manic episode - hence the usage of ‘Manic Depression’ as an older term for the condition.

Both depressive and manic episodes can last weeks, with the sufferer often experiencing only short periods of ‘normal’ emotion.

Throughout his life, Churchill displayed almost classic symptoms of Bipolar Disorder.

Churchill himself was aware of his condition, referring to his depressive phases as his ‘Black Dog’.

I quote;

‘I don't like standing near the edge of a platform when an express train is passing through. I like to stand right back and if possible get a pillar between me and the train. I don't like to stand by the side of a ship and look down into the water. A second's action would end everything. A few drops of desperation.’

Lord Beaverbrook described Churchill as being either

‘....at the top of the wheel of confidence or at the bottom of an intense depression..’

Churchill often displayed abnormal energy - he would often only sleep four hours a night and begin his working day - sometimes from his bed - at 08.00 and keep working until 04.00 the following morning - much to the discomfort of his colleagues and staff, who were not necessarily at their best when summoned to a conference at 3 in the morning.

Churchill often displayed distain for the opinions of others, believing his opinion to be correct and that of everyone else to be wrong.

He displayed extreme belligerence in his personal relationships - and more importantly - in his attitude to politics.

Churchill thought and acted in very black and white terms, which is perhaps not the best type of thought pattern when applied to the art of international diplomacy.

 

Consider Churchill’s career over the previous fifty odd years.

In his varying capacities as a British Army officer and war correspondent, Churchill appears to have relished the prospect of placing himself in harm’s way.

He travelled to Cuba in 1895 in order to report on the guerrilla war then taking place, he requested and was granted attachment to Jeffery’s campaign on the North- West Frontier in 1897, took part in the Sudan campaign with the 21st Lancers, obtained a commission as a war correspondent to report on the Second Boer War, was captured and interned in Boer POW camp, only to escape and take part in the relieve Ladysmith...there is no doubting Churchill’s personal bravery ( or foolhardiness, depending upon one’s point of view ).

Churchill’s political career, commencing with his election to Parliament as the Member for Oldham in 1900, was as varied and turbulent as his military career.

He changed party allegiance on more than one occasion over his career, and during his period with the pre war Liberal government was at least partially responsible for a number of Liberal Reforms - interestingly, he was opposed to the plans to build of the ‘Dreadnought’ series of ‘superbattleships’, especially considering his later appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty - and, to my mind, somewhat chillingly, he pushed for the sterilisation of the mentally deficient whilst helping to draft the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 - Churchill believed in eugenics. I do not need to make the obvious connection.

As First Lord, Churchill was largely responsible for the Antwerp action in October 1914, and for the concept of the disastrous Gallipoli adventure, involvement in which fiasco cost him his job.

He then commanded a battalion of the RSF in the Ploegsteert sector of the Western Front, again taking the opportunity to place himself in harm’s way on numerous occasions.

His return to politics in March of 1916 led to him becoming Minister of Munitions, and, latterly, Secretary of State for War.

Churchill was largely responsible for the establishment of the so called ‘Ten Year Rule’ - a nifty piece of legislation that allowed the Treasury to severely curtail military spending on the assumption that there would be no major war for a rolling period of ten years - a disastrous piece of legislation, in my view, which essentially stagnated the Empire’s armed forces development until the wake up call of the mid 1930’s.

Churchill could still be very forceful in his prosecution of his own beliefs. Of especial interest, given his later support for the Stalinist Soviet Union in defeating Germany, Churchill was the driving force behind Allied intervention in the Russian civil war - he is recorded as declaring that

‘Bolshevism must be ‘strangled in its cradle’.

In common with certain other world leaders in the 1920’s and 30’s, Churchill is on record as seeing a link between Communism and World Jewry - I quote;

‘ This movement among Jews is not new ....but a ‘world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilisation and for the reconstitution of society on the basis of arrested development, of envious malevolence, and impossible inequality’.

Sound familiar?

Churchill again crossed the floor, to rejoin the Conservative Party, was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, and created an economic crisis by returning the country to the Gold Standard, leading to deflation, unemployment and, ultimately, the General Strike of 1926 - probably the nearest the British ever came to revolution in modern history.

Again, Churchill expressed what can only be described as an interesting point of view, given later circumstances, when he described Mussolini’s Fascist Italy as a ‘bulwark against communism’.

Churchill supported Japanese activity in Manchuria, despite that activity being overtly expansionist and totalitarian in nature.

Churchill was ostracised by the Baldwin government of the early thirties, following his standpoint on the question of granting India Dominion status.

Churchill’s attitude to India can, in retrospect, only be described as viciously racist in nature and his attitude towards Ghandi’s efforts at Indian Independence as murderous.

More on this subject later.

Churchill supported Franco’s Fascist Rebels over the Republican ‘ Communist Front’ in the Spanish Civil War, and continued to speak in praise of Mussolini’s Fascist Italy until only two years before the outbreak of war.

To the House of Commons in 1937;

‘I will not pretend that, if I had to choose between Communism and Nazism, I would choose Communism.’

Read that again. And again. And again.

Churchill, however, vehemently opposed Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement.

I personally believe he did not understand the true motivation behind Chamberlain’s apparent compliancy with Hitler’s every whim and demand and, indeed , never did.

At the outbreak of war, Churchill was recalled to his old position as First Lord of the Admiralty and was largely responsible for proposing the Narvik landings, as discussed earlier in this ridiculously long post.

Riding out the backlash against Chamberlain, Churchill found himself Prime Minister.

His appointment was greeted with silence by the House of Lords.

 

So far, I have written my personal take on the history behind the events that occurred in May and June 1940, and a brief look at the leaders of the respective surviving combatant nations.

Lurking in the background and as yet not mentioned, are three other contemporary major players on the world stage, namely the democratic United States, the communist USSR and Imperial Japan - a fascist totalitarian state in all but name.

Since the purpose of this essay/ post / waste of time and hard disc space is essentially a ‘what if’, the impact of these lurking powers on the scenario I will shortly be proposing will be essentially different to that which actually occurred in real historical terms, so I will, for the sake of simplicity, set them aside for the moment and introduce what I think their reactions and contributions would have been had the circumstances surrounding the cross channel Mexican standoff resulted in a different outcome to that which actually occurred.

The fourth background player, Fascist Italy, will play a part rather earlier in the scenario, but not quite yet.

 

I know what you mean about 'Versaille' being the seed for a future conflict. Indeed many historians believe that there was in fact only one war with a twenty year break.

However, I totally disagree with your reasoning as to why America joined the war in 1917.

Wars are usually fought over money and influence. Europe was no different.

A family feud if you like between Queen Victoria's grandchildren over who would rape and pillage Africa and the far east. A filthy disgusting war that should never have been fought and 11 million men paid the price.

America was not unhappy with the situation. The major European powers were tearing themselves apart, thank you very much and that suited the U.S.

So why did America eventually take the stance of declaring war on Germany?
The Lusitania? No. This took place in May 1915 almost two years previously.
Unrestricted submarine warfare? No that had been virtually ongoing for most of the war and in January 1917 became official but America still did not declare war until April 6th 1917, fully three months later.

As I said at the beginning, it was about money.

America had loaned Britain and France $2 billion dollars around $80 billion in todays money. They could therefore not allow Germany to win. Victory by the Kaiser would have meant defaulting on this debt.

So why April 1917?

Well, think about it, what happened in March 1917?
Answer: The Czar abdicated and that meant that sooner rather than later, Russia was going to drop out of the war and that meant no Eastern front and that meant with all her forces directed against the allies then Germany just might win. By no means certain but a distinct possibilty.

This from Americas standpoint could not be allowed to happen, they had invested far too much cash.

There was one other reason and that was so Wilson could put his feet under the table at the peace conference, but this is secondary.

 

You bring a good point to the table Fred. I hate to admit it but most of the time if it involves the U.S. it is about the Benjamins. Although every once in awhile we do come through on the side of the angels.

 

Fred

You're absolutely right - but the public consumption version was because of the submarine warfare, I think.

But yeah - fundamentally America is / was / ever more shall be a business venture in the guise of a nation.

Could even go into a bit of a rant about the whole premise of the War of Independence being bit of a porky pie, but not the place, and I don't want to wind our US colleagues up any more than I am likely to do in the next few pages ( sorry in advance, jrj1701!!! )

I'll continue with the mammoth thread post when I get my act together later this weekend - too many doctor's visits this week and the old noggin is feeling a wee bit spaced out.

 

Right, back to it.

This is such an emotive subject that I feel it necessary to point out that this scenario is postulated as attempting to be completely objective, without any personal bias, or as to my being for, or against, the policies of any of the national governments at the precise point in time under consideration, or of any of the policies followed by those governments during the period before, or after, June / July 1940.

It is, however, germane to the subject to comment on the political reality as it stood in 1940.

Firstly, it should be remembered that the British remained an imperial power.

This is a difficult point to discuss when viewed through a 21st Century moral standpoint. It must be remembered the British Empire was, at that time, made up of a vast mixture of Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandates.

I suggest leaving the Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa partially out of the equation at this point, mainly because these countries were essentially independent countries, following the 1931 Statute of Westminster, still theoretically part of the Empire, with the King regarded as Head of State, but with their own legislatures and exercising control of their own domestic policy.

Britain had been given mandates, on behalf of the League of Nations, consisting of former Ottoman and German colonies at the close of the First World War, in order to prepare them for self government at some point in the future.

As of June 1940, these mandates consisted of Trans-Jordan Palestine, Tanganyika, and South West Africa.

Furthermore, Britain had power and jurisdiction over the foreign affairs of a large number of ‘protectorates’. These territories enjoyed the protection of His Britannic Majesty in 1940, although the Crown had no jurisdiction in the government of their internal affairs.

In 1940, the protectorates consisted of ;

Aden, Anglo- Egyptian Sudan (theoretically, but not really in practice, in condominium with Egypt ), Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the Trucial States ( essentially the United Arab Republics ), British Somaliland, Brunei, Bhutan, British North Borneo, Malaya, the Federated Malayan States, the Unfederated Malayan States, Johor, Kedah, Kelentan, Perlis, Terengganu, the Indian Princely States ( those parts of the Indian subcontinent not formally annexed by the British and not part of British India ), the Maldives, Sikkim, Sarawak, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, British East Africa, Gambia, Kenya, Barotseland, Northern Rhodesia, the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, Nyasaland, the colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Walbis Bay, Zanzibar, the British Solomon Islands, and Tonga.

Quite a list.


Then there were the Colonies, those territories that were wholly governed from London, although not formally part of the UK, subject to British Law, with Royal authority represented by a Governor, appointed, by London.

In 1940, the Colonies were;

Basutoland, Gambia, Gold Coast, Southern Rhodesia ( self governing ), Uganda, The Leeward Islands, The Bahamas, Barbados, British Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Windward Islands, British Guiana, Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Sarawak, the Straits Settlements ( including Singapore ), Cyprus, Gibraltar, Malta, British Antarctic Territory, Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, St Helena ( and Ascension Island ), Mauritius, the Seychelles, Fiji, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the Pitcairn Islands, the New Hebrides, and the Solomon Islands.

And, of course, British India, the Raj, the Jewel in the Crown.

My apologies if I have made the odd error, or forgotten a Territory here or an Island there, no insult is meant to anyone.

The point is that Britain, in 1940, either ruled absolutely, was responsible for the external affairs of, or served as the ‘Mother Country’, to an incredibly large proportion of the world’s land surface, natural resources and peoples.




Was the Empire a GOOD THING because Britain was TOP NATION?

 

Well, yes and no.

Without going too far into the morality of the situation, I think I can reasonably suggest that the British were responsible, in a very Victorian, paternalistic fashion for at least some benefits to the peoples of the Territories ( for the sake of saving myself from RSI, I’ll use ‘Territories’ as a catch all term ) mentioned above.

At least until the Treaty of Washington, the Royal Navy had been able to pretty well guarantee the security of the Territories and their peoples against foreign aggression ( even if that aggression were to come from a similarly imperialistic power), had provided a degree of law, order and infrastructure, both socially and in terms of solid works of engineering.

The British Empire was also an exploitative, racist conglomeration that often allowed a privileged minority to rule by the application or threat of force. It could be distressingly negligent towards the well-being of those peoples falling into its sphere of influence ( I use the term for a reason! ) and certainly operated in an authoritarian, and, sometimes, quite despotic fashion towards them.

By the late 30’s, I think it would be true to say that the ‘winds of change’ were starting to at least stir a breeze.

The Empire actually cost more to run that it generated, the Royal Navy could no longer afford to guarantee its security at sea - the 5:5:3 ratio of warships agreement and the abandonment of the Anglo- Japanese agreement, coupled with the complacent austerity of the 1920's and early 30's Naval procurement programs ( thanks Winston! ) had seen to that - and the British Army was, particularly in the Middle and Far East, almost ridiculously short of manpower and even remotely modern equipment. The Royal Air Force's equipment and strength was.....laughable.

Given the ever increasing internal pressures from political groups in many of the colonies to assert their independence, I am of the opinion that the Empire would have started to collapse, even if the Second World War had not intervened, by the latter part of the 1950’s at the very latest.

Whether the nature of that collapse would have taken a different course, is entirely open to debate.

What can be said, without fear of contradiction, is that in 1940, Britain already had, and had for a long time, an extensive and exploitative - or at least heavily biased in favour of whites - empire that spread over much of the globe.

Perhaps because of this, one should not be surprised that the prevalent views of many British statesmen were, if not convinced by, at least influenced by the ideas of the racial superiority of the ‘white’ over the ‘black’ or ‘coloured’ peoples of the world.

Offensive now, yes, but then.....not so much.

I apologise, once again, for over simplifying the point, there are so many shades of grey involved that it is almost impossible to look at the British Empire without seriously treading on somebody's toes, so I hope I may be forgiven for causing offence to anyone - it is unintentional.