During WWII, most of the Allies had their women population to join the production. In the U.S. there were women producing all kinds of weapons from tanks to aircraft. In USSR, they even had old women to join the production. I remember seeing a photo somewhere...a bunch of old women were keeping POWs in lines in a factory lol. If I am not mistaken, neither Germany nor Japan had any female workers in their production lines. Since women are pretty much half of the overall population, make good use of these manpower (womenpower really lol) could have almost doubled the productivity. Why didn't the Axis do it?
I believe the Axis were probably under the assumption and possible stereotypes of men doing the heavy labor while women tend the home. I am not remotely surprise that Germany never utilize women on the production line. I feel in Hitler's Germany, not only did you have to fit the phenotype desire physically but you also had to play your gender role as well. I apply the same reasoning with Japan too.
I can understand Japan was being more "traditional", but Germany... it was one of the most advanced countries in Europe. Even USSR were using female labors while they had a larger pool of men. I can also understand the "stereotypes" or "gender role", but when the war wasn't going well for them... they could have at least considered to use the extra human resources at their disposal when they were really short on (man)power at all fronts. By letting women to join the productivity, they could have freed up lots of men and use them on the battlefield. Not to mention that the Axis were always at disadvantage when it came to mass producing weapons due to limited resources. By allowing women to be used as human resources other than just "domestic helpers", they could have increased their productions for their war effort.
At the end of the war there were actually about 500,000 women in the Wehrmacht. Most of them were there voluntarily. They exclusively did non-combat work, but that's how just about every country used them in the period. Keep in mind that the total size of the Wehrmacht was about 2 million in 1945, so they made up 1/4 of it. Not too bad.
Really? I was not aware of it. What kind of work were they doing? Maintenance for the equipments? Cooking? Nursing? Almost every military on the planet had women as nurses in the military. What about the productivity in the war industries? Germany never seemed to produce enough of what their military had ordered. It certainly looked like they could use more help in the factories.
In Germany there were many women in the labour force, if you count the Jews of the forced labour camps. As German women working, it was done, but in ways other than heavy construction or factory. Adolf frowned on "working women", other than farming and food service and nursing. He wanted women reproducing: making more Germans to settle the new terrtories to the east.
Snippets on the Japanese situation From USSBS “The Effect of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy” (Summary Report 1947) pages 24 & 25: The Japanese economy had been confronted with the problem of manpower deficiencies even before the war. The rapid industrialization of the country in the 1930's created a shortage of engineering skill and trained labor which remained a constant limitation to a flexible economy. From 1939 on, however, the government made a strenuous attempt to consolidate the labor force for a major war. Workers in commerce, export manufacturing, domestic service, and other non-essential activities were gradually diverted into war production. By curtailment of materials, electric power, and the conscription of workers, nonessential industry, including the traditional 1 to 10 worker "home-industry" shop, was largely eliminated by 1944. The conscription of workers for war production, which began in 1939, did not reach a peak until 1943, by which time over 1,300,000 workers had been drafted for war industries. Conscription thereafter, in 1944 and 1945, having exhausted most of the supply, accounted for less than 300,000 additional workers. To supplement this group of conscript workers, women and students were also drafted for industrial work. The insufficiency of Japanese administration and management was most conspicuous in the control of labor. The Welfare Ministry, which exercised broad control over a complicated network of regional and prefectural labor offices, was never able or willing to take the strong measures demanded by the situation. Army and Navy consultants, who exerted powerful influence in local labor offices, were largely responsible for the maladministration of the labor force. Military conscription depleted the ranks of skilled workers by as much as 30 percent in some industries. Allocations of new workers were made on the basis of Army-Navy preferences instead of actual need. No attempt was ever made to check on the utilization of labor by industry, with the result that the quality of the labor force deteriorated. Large industries were favored, both by labor allocations and by extra worker rations of food and clothing, which enabled them to abide by wage controls and still maintain their labor force. Small industries received only negligible allocations of labor and no extra rations, and were consequently forced to patronize labor black markets. By early 1945, the control of labor was disorganized to such an extent that centralized administration was relinquished by the Welfare Ministry. However, by that time, prefectural and regional controls, to whom final authority was delegated, were themselves so disrupted by the air attacks that control of any kind practically ceased. The total labor force in the industrial sample which has been used as the basis for the analysis of production in a preceding chapter amounted to 1,708,402 workers in January 1945. This figure represents 18 percent of the national manufacturing labor force. During the sampling period from October 1943 through July 1945, the labor force sample rose from 1.6 million workers in the early months of 1944 to 1.8 million in October 1944, the peak month, and declined by July to 1.6 million, or to about the same point as it was in early 1944. Considering the radical decline in production during 1945 and the maintenance of the relatively high level of workers, it is immediately clear that there was no scarcity of labor. A labor force, however, cannot be judged in terms of numbers. In terms of productive labor hours worked, the only real index of an effective labor force, the sample data indicated that, in July 1945, the effective labor force was at a level of 61 percent of the base year (October 1943-September 1944) and 55 percent of the October 1944 peak. From USSBS “Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex – Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama” (1947) page 1: By the time the air attack was seriously undertaken against the Japanese home islands, in November 1944, Japan had been conducting military campaigns in China for seven years, and the Pacific phase of World War II had been under way for three years. The far flung activities of its army and navy had drained the resources of the nation, the tightening Allied blockade and the submarine menace had reduced its sea-borne traffic, and its inept policy in allocating men and materials at home had placed a further strain on the already disintegrating economy. The great port city of Yokohama, which had long handled a quarter of Japan's foreign trade and ranked second in importance among the shipping centers of the Empire, was almost at a standstill, and its shipyards were given over to the repair of the few ships that could still put into its harbor. The enormous industrial concentration of Kawasaki was rapidly consuming its diminishing supply of raw materials in a final spurt of forced production; and the vast assembly plants of Tokyo were suffering a critical lack of component parts, which could no longer be turned out in sufficient quantities to meet the demands of the war machine. Although electric power was still abundant, the supply of coal had long been critically short, and consumption of its by-products, coke and gas, was drastically curtailed. While a sufficient number of workers was at all times available to industry, the efficiency of the labor force had been greatly reduced because of the administration's inability to achieve an equitable distribution of manpower between military and civilian requirements; and the conscription of skilled workers for the armed forces had left a void that could not be adequately filled with untrained laborers, women and minors. Thus, despite the fact that industry by consuming its dwindling inventories, had attained a peak production during the last months of 1944, the decline had already set in before the first devastating incendiary raid, in March 1945, laid waste to almost 16 square miles of the most densely populated areas of Tokyo. From War Organization of Japan, Advanced Echelon Pacific Air Command, page 50: The Japanese farmer used to be able to add a little to his living by tending mulberry trees and raising cocoons for silk, but the export market has gone and the mulberry groves are being cut down to make room for grain. To keep going at all the farmer and his household labor long hours in the warm muck of the rice, fields. The soil must be worked carefully, as a nurseryman prepares a seedbed, before the rice-plants are set out. The fertilizer must be kneaded into the irrigated soil to produce a watery mulch eight to twenty-four inches deep. The, plants are set out 'by hand, weeded and cultivated by hand from three to five times a' season, and harvested with sickles. Some, landowners and village cooperatives own- gasoline threshing machines for wheat and millet, but rice is usually threshed out "by hand and foot power. The whole family, from the eighty-year-old grandmother to the six-year-old child, helps with planting, weeding and harvesting. Farm women spend the majority of their days in the fields rather than in their houses. Same, pages 51-52: In 1936, just before the war with China, there were about five million workers in Japanese industry. During the war there were more than- twice that number. More than ten thousand small shops in Tokyo alone were closed to free 15,000 shopkeepers for shipyards and armament plants. Women were taken from the silk mills and light industries of peace to manufacture aircraft and munitions . . . Many workers were taken from the white-collar groups and from the farms. About half of the entire industrial labor force was made up of women, 25% of boys and girls under twenty years old, the other 25% of men. They worked from 12 to 16 hours a day with two days of rest each month; and they could not leave their jobs nor change jobs. The very highest-paid, in heavy industries, earned up to the equivalent of three American dollars a day, but at least 30% of workers' wages, and in many cases as much as 75% was drained off by taxes, compulsory "savings" and bond purchases. The savings have now largely -disappeared, and the bonds will probably be repudiated. In terms of real wages, the industrial workers are very meagerly paid for their labor. They ate during the war about two-thirds as much as they were accustomed to eat, although, workers in heavy industry got a larger rice ration than ordinary citizens. Twice a day blaring loud-speakers sent them to factory roofs for a few minutes of languid calisthenics . . . From Japanese Monograph #118 – Operational History of Japanese Naval Communications Dec 1941 – Aug 1945, page 408, in the section: “Communications Preparations of Fifth Air Fleet”: Regarding communications personnel, approximately 700 apprentice seamen from the Kure, Maizuru and Sasebo Naval Districts were sent the bases as reinforcements. In addition the bases were strengthened with a crew of women communications personnel from the Women Volunteer Emergency Service. (120 women for Kanoya and Oita respectively). more to follow
More snippets Interrogation No 88, Commander Omatsu, Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry. Statistical Control Office, Advanced Echelon, Pacific Air Command, U S Army, 11 January 1946. Statement was in regard to personnel reporting systems: 11. Commander Omatsu's Opinion of the System. Commander Omatsu says that before the war and for a while after the start of the war the system worked very well. As the war advanced it became increasingly difficult for the Naval Districts to get prompt accurate reports from their subordinate units - - this introduced an uncertain degree of error. The consolidations in the Naval Districts required much work which was largely done by comparatively unskilled civilian women. He thinks that there is a possibility that such consolidation might have been more promptly and more accurately by use of machines but never having had experience with such machines he is not certain. [Ed. I corrected a couple of obvious spelling errors in this passage, but could not help that last sentence . . . a word is missing between “accurately” and “by” that could be anything.] Interrogation No 90, Captain Ogata, Chief of Engine Repair 1st Naval Depot. Statistical Control Office, Advanced Echelon, Pacific Air Command, U S Army, 14 January 1946. Statement is in regard to staffing at the depot: 3. Personnel: The engine department normally had about 1500 men and 500 women as civilian workers. About 30 of these men were considered as officer class personnel although they were not in the Navy. Men and women were constantly being taken away; men called to the colors, and women being sent to critical zones as Java, Manila, Malay, etc., thus making it very difficult to keep up the strength of the section. Also might want to look at: http://www.ieeeghn.org/wiki/index.php/Japanese_Women_and_the_Japanese_War_Effort and http://today.duke.edu/2003/03/japan_lecture0321.html and if you can get your hands on one . . . Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two, Thomas R Havens, Norton, 1978
One book you might find interesting on the topic is Women at War 1939-45, by Jack Cassin-Scott. Its, frankly, too short of a text, but it does cover some the Axis manpower, eh rather, womanpower employed during the war. On the Axis side, it only goes into the German military apparatus in any detail, though there is a short mention of women serving in the Italian Social Republic.
Well the Germans used slave labour to meet the needs. Millions of east block citizens along with Russian prisoners of war. Thousands of French moved to Germany as labour. Not to mention of the untold numbers of Hitler's political opponents and Jew's imprisoned into camps. And the assumption of Germany not employing women into factory work is false. Even though the Japan's front is less known to me i recall seeing several examples of Japanese women aiding in factory work.
Hitler's ideology of the human race was that the man was to prove that he was a man. That's why homosexuals were killed/sent to concentration camps (I am obviously not saying homosexuality makes you less of a man than being heterosexual. I am just stating The Reich's thoughts.) While the female was to stay at home and raise the children. The axis' strength would have been extraordinarly stronger if they hadn't been so tied to their ideology and thoughts. It would have been seen has ridiculous and against the "laws of nature" to even think about women doing heavy labour or a task that required a lot of strength. They believed this was for the men. I am only speaking from what I know about Germany. I do not know about Japan's thoughts on the matter so well, so I won't make a false comment for them.
Several examples do not represent all. There might be a few women working here and there in Japan and Germany, but majority of them do not take the traditional role of men in heavy industrial sector. Alliances certainly took full advantage of their womenpower despite the fact they already greatly outnumber axis in the term of manpower.
From above re: Japanese labor force: ". . . About half of the entire industrial labor force was made up of women, 25% of boys and girls under twenty years old, the other 25% of men. . . ." You seem to have some pretty definitive opinions on the subject. Perhaps you have some sources which provide refutation . . . beyond just an opinion, that is.
I dont know why the Axis didn't take advantage of the help women could have given them during the war. In Germany I'm sure it had something to do with women being inferior in the eyes of the evil men who ran the country. I'm sure glad they didn't let their women involve themselves in the war quite as much as the Americans did. Who knows, it could have made them victorious in the war effort, but that would have made for a very dark and bleak future for the rest of mankind.
Be the reason whatever it is also good to note that any resentments the Ruling nazi's had were first and foremost political. Great many exceptions were made during the war and also before it. For few examples in many cases certain people's past dealings against the values of the party were ignored. Having warm relations to certain Palestinian's for example went against many such values of nazi's. Whole armies of men fighting for germany that were effectively "underhumans" labeled by the nazi's. My point here being that great many exceptions were made in the name of necessity. Therefore i highly doubt that simple sovinism could explain the lack of women workforce in organized manner. Instead i have several times ran into other reasons why such organization was pointless. First of all Hitler's expectations were in fast victory and for this reason the german production started going into serious wartime focus after 1941. The Gröfas own continuous meddling in production doctrines (Grosses feldherr aller zeiten=greatest field master of all times. A nickname of Hitler) lead to focus on unnecessarily high quality products. And finally perhaps the most biggest reason of all such as scarcity of raw materials, which can also be argued as main reason for Italy's very poor wartime performance. In so many ways the game was rigged from the start. Logic and abundance of impossibilities marked the germany's fate sealed quite possibly as early as invasion of Poland. The rest was simply a matter of time.
Das Deutsche Madel: https://www.scribd.com/search-documents?escape=false&page=1&query=das deutsche madel
Not true to say German women were not used - the 'Duty Year' which was compulsory service to the nation and by 1945 half a million women were in the services as auxiliaries. 1938: "A soldier free up" To avoid losing only people comrade in service for his country, the National Socialists lead on 15 February 1938, a so-called compulsory year for girls and unmarried women under 25 years of age. Twelve months they have to do service for a token salary on a farm or in a large family. Some 300,000 "compulsory year girl" are affected every year of it. An Inferior woman ? Part 1 of 3:
