I received my copy of World War II magazine last week. In the latest edition they have a very provocative article and question: which leader during the Second World War is the most overrated? Now the question isn't who's the weakest, and goodness knows that isn't a hard question, but the most overrated. So, what say you, which leader is overrated by historians, the common folk, and all in between? Most importantly, why? Thanks!
Mark Clark. While he was a man of charm and personal courage his war record betrays him. While CIC in Italy he had access to ULTRA Intelligence. Three times, after recieving Ultra knowledge which should have made him aware that planned operation would fail, he failed to cancel these operations. This cost the lives of many American GIs, for no gain. Three times. Some generals worked magic using Ultra, Mark Clark worked failures.
He told to call him Meyer, many knows him as der Dicke, but the military history closed his charismatic chapter as the most collapsed piller of the Reichstag, Göring! MacArthur (Pearl Harbor AFB attacking infos), Churchill (for Gallipoli failure) etc are full of closely knitted pros and cons, but neither the wartime historians nor the contemporary reseachers ever declined their military involvements as they did for Göring. They nicely by passed the powerfull Nazi propaganda machines too. I never mind to rethink what he had done for Hitler to close the chapter of Rohm, been acted as the most vital adhesive for the Hitler-Göring covallent bond, that existed upto just before the final day of Hitler. This highest addicted man of the Reichstag earned the GC of the IC, but sent the Luftwaffe to the hell. As gladly Göring presented the GSC to Lindbergh as that it seems to me Roosevelt, being signing the no military conflict pact! Again, this old NSDP man was made as the head of finance of the Reichstag, and its pros and cons are at your hand to see, he was the Deputy, too, I wonder! There was Yamamoto, there were Bradly, Sato, Monty too, but no one been found comparable to this pesonnel, Göring.
Reinhard Gehlen would be my choice for the most incompetent leader in his capacity as chief of intelligence of the German eastern front. This guy was so incompetent he in the summer of 1942 underestimated the strength of the red army by well over a million men. Even after these reserve armies had been engaging the Germans in the Don bend the lieutenant colonel refused to believe in their existence. His predecessor who was correct was fired for telling the truth about Soviet power. Gehlen was the perfect yes man. Negligent in his duties and unwilling to take serious the intelligence reports of his subordinates. He only reported what the general staff wanted to hear. His incompetence is legendary, surpassed only by the German general staff who appointed him. The grossly over rated German general staff, with sleeves rolled up pouring over maps, plotting axis of advance were oblivious to the dangers of extended sorties into very hostile areas with little to no flank protection. So arrogant they refused to believe their system of supply was broken and that the enemy was getting stronger by the day. It is amazing that field commanders were as a rule quite good in the German army and the general staff so incompetent. All you have to do is read the diary of Franz Halder to see what the level of performance of these men really was. Forget what they said after the war to a man they lied to save their necks. It was all Hitler's fault they cried. The diary proves otherwise. So with that in mind the award was a team effort. They all had a hand in the destruction of the German army and ultimately the destruction of the nation itself. Only a fool appoints a fool to a position of that importance. Which brings us to the question of why a colonel was appointed chief of intelligence for what was the most important sector of the war. The Russians on the other hand had a general in this command and his feet was put to the fire to produce results. So what happened to Gehlen after the war? He was given a job at NATO.
Sorry to contradict you Bniziol but you err in detail. Gehlen did not work for NATO, but US Military Intelligence. He had made contact with Allen Dulles (OSS, future head of the CIA) who met him in Bavaria(?) to accept the surrender of not only him but all of Fremde Herre Ost-- files and personnel. Everything was transported to Virginia Beach, Virginia, USA, where the personnel worked for US Intelligence for some three years. After that time the personnel were returned to West Germany, where Gehlen became head of the FDR military intelligence. The files remained in the US. Also remaining in American hands was control of the stay-behind units, freedom fighters, liberation commandos, et cetera, which remained. I do not know how much was left after the Nazi collapse, but allegedly the Germans had established agents in territories knowing they would be overrun. It was hoped the agents would operate undercover and remain free to operate, much like the Marquee in France. As far as Gehlen's professional competence, I rate him similar as the head of the Abwher. It was not that Gehlen was providing bad intelligence as having those above him not accepting the data provided. Like the American writer Dorthy Parker said: "You can lead a whore to culture but you can't make her THINK." But as West Germany was a part of NATO I can understand your error. It is like making the CIA or Department of Homeland Security an arm of NATO.
Thank you straightening that out for me. The campaign of the summer of 42 IMO was undertaken with intelligence that was nothing more than wishful thinking. The man Gehlen replaced who ended up attached to the 6th army had a very clear picture of what they were up against and documented it but was sent packing. Who fired him is unknown but Gehlen brought a more compliant position to the table. It makes a lot of sense to say Gehlen had a clear picture no one wanted to listen. The problem I have with that is what Halder says in his diary and what he said after the war are two different accounts of the same events. His diary entries of early to mid summer mention nothing about powerful Russian reserves or any reports from Gehlen that would indicate they were up against something more than what they believed. It is however well documented that Gehlen did send a Major to the fronts of both army groups to report on the situation. The report was not conclusive but rather asked more questions than it answered. If he had a clear picture he was keeping it to himself. Quite possible when one considers it was for the most part better to be wrong with Hitler than right against him. But for me it just does not add up. I see a situation where a man is clearly over his head in a command he neither the background nor the foresight to execute with any degree of efficiency. When you look at reports that were not destroyed and there is not a lot of them it looks very much to me like both Gehlen and Halder thought the Russians were about done up until the actual assault on the city of Stalingrad. What we do know is the Russians had a reserve of 10 armies in the early summer of 42. The first of these the 5th tank being feed into the battle around Voronezh and latter more formations appearing in the Don bend. Why was Halder during the hostilities in the Don bend still in his diary recording he was unsure if the Russians could even muster a reserve force of any size, and of what value they would be in combat. He had been engaging reserve armies for over a month! 6th army command was already getting nervous about Russian power in the don bend but still no accurate intelligence as to what they were up against. It took till late summer for Halder to realize according to his diary that the Russians were stronger that first imagined by that time he was in the process of being relived. What he said after the war differs a great deal with this account. I stick with my position that Gehlen was hopelessly incompetent. The magnitude of his mistakes were so damaging to the German war effort that some say they could never recover from the losses. I do however agree that there was a attitude within the German high command that the Russians could not possibly conduct further offensive operations in the south and the best they could possibly hope for is to be able to respond to German intentions with what little they had left. Gehlen IMO was of this opinion which was possibly the most deciding factor in loss of the 6th army and most of the 4th panzer army. Thanks for responses they are always welcome.
