The first plans for the Battle of the Somme were drawn up by Rawlinson and his Chief of Staff, Montgomery at Haig's direction. Rawlinson realised that the German defences were immensely strong - and it is worth while describing their strength in detail. Rawlinson was aware of their strength when he drew up his plans and he knew what the attacking British would have to contend with. The Germans had completed two lines of defence; the 'First Position' and the 'Second Position' but there was in fact a "Third Position' partly constructed, but this was unknown to Rawlinson at that time. The 'First Position' was on the forward slope of a chalk ridge, it included three trenches each about 150 - 200 yards apart, protected by two belts of barbed wire 30 yards deep and 15 yards apart. The 'First Position' incorporated a number of fortified villages (Serre, Beaumont Hamel, Thiepval, Ovillers, La Boiselle, Fricourt and Mametz, all names that have gone down in history). These villages incorporated many deep dugouts, impervious to all but a direct hit from the heaviest shell, and with room for up to 25 men each to wait out an artillery bombardment in safety. Behind the 'First Position' was the 'Second Position', on the reverse side of the ridge. Between the Positions were a series of redoubts with all round fields of fire, such as the Schwaben redoubt, these were connected to the First and Second Positions. The 'Second Position' was 2000-4000 yards behind the 'First Position' with its own dense barbed wire and three lines of trenches, as in the 'First Position', but this was on the REVERSE slope and was therefore invisible to the British artillery! Rawlinson and Montgomery's plan was to initiate a heavy, prolonged bombardment of the First Position and then take the First Position cautiously by a bite and hold strategy, bringing up the artillery after taking the 'First Position' so that they could eventually observe the next attack on the reverse side of the ridge. Haig rejected much of this plan as he considered it was too cautious and because it made no attempt to achieve surprise. Haig proposed that the lengthy bombardment be changed to a short intensive bombardment immediately preceding the assault (to take advantage of surprise) and the assault was to take BOTH the First and Second Positions in the north and to secure the Montauben Ridge and (fortified) Montauben village in the south - On the first day!! After discussion, however, he agreed to keep the prolonged bombardment but insisted on the advance to be continued after the First Position was taken. In view of the extraordinarily strong German defences, it is difficult to understand why Haig overruled Rawlinson's approach. Harris ("Douglas Haig and the First World War" by J. P. Harris, 2008, Cambridge University Press.) suggests that one reason was that Haig failed to understand the value and limitations of his artillery! It also appears to me that Haig was quite unable to envisage the effect of the 'Second Position' with its uncut wire on his troops, exhausted by their attack on the 'First Position' with its fortified villages. Harris points out that Rawlinson's plan would likely have failed because of inadequate artillery and ammunition, and, by engaging on too wide a front, he would dissipate the effect of his guns. However, in the event, Haig's rejection of so much of Rawlinson's plan must surely have contributed greatly to the appalling bloodletting that characterised the first day of the Somme.
