Well, from December '41 to February '42, within 2 1/2 months the game was over as soon as the Fortress fell. Some 60 000 to 95 000 (differs in various sources) allied soldiers became JPOW! http://www.britain-at-war.org.uk/WW2/Malaya_and_Singapore/body_index.htm Churchill should have been more constructive by increasing the strength of RAF alongwith the RN, instead of false promising for the Far east.
The Royal Navy tasked with single handedly dominating the North Sea, Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, simply did not have the resources to form a Fleet at Singapore. It was planned to have a defensive force centred on 5 Battleships and an Aircraft Carrier in the Indian Ocean in mid 1942. As for the RAF? buying the Brewster Buffalo was a mistake but there was simply not enough modern aircraft available for Malaya. In February 1942 only days after Singapore fell, the Germans sent two major ships through the English Channel from France to Germany, the British failed to stop them. At that time there were only three Squadrons of modern Bristol Beaufort torperdo bombers in the whole of the UK, all still in training. Malaya was due to receive them in 1942, in fact the first one had arrived by the time the Japanese attacked. The Japanese attacked at just the right time, 6 months later and it would have been a different story.
Crisis alongwith enormous pressure upon the RAF due to their ongoing campaign against DAK. Churchill, being under such circumstances unable to provide a better option other than bringing Lt Gen Gott CB, CBE, DSO & Bar, MC in a Bristall Bombay (transporter)/216Sq RAF, from Cairo and killed (what a loss!) unfortunately. So the ongoing crisis of air support is regarded as one of the major causes that led to the downfall of Malaya, I admit. But a little bit more initiative, if taken, the Japanese could have not overran Malaya playfully. The other notable neglected but vital factors that the Commwealth war planners for the East, Far East etc. were (no/minimal somewhere) AA setups, wide area intelligence network coverage, so that they could have gather the news of possible Japanese air raid. But the Japanese had been very successful to send every details of the fortification of Malaya, specially in Singapore through their active Kempeitai network. The fortifications were enormous. Twelve massive fortifications installed with 15''(38cm), 9'' guns, ready to overthrough any attack from the south. Japanese knew very well that if they led their strike from the south, the reasult might not be favorable. So their war planners looked for Betties (for which they practiced about several months in their target shooting exercises). Betties were fast and capable to carryout long range bombing but vulnerable if received a couple of 'good' hit, these were without armor. Had there good AA batteries, I hope the Japanese could have been in great distress! I admit the limitations of RAF for that period, but this never means that you could relax under the fortification! Think about the big numbers of POW taken by the enemy! Churchill however abled to convince his downstream that Singapore was impregnable and that the Japanese wouldn't dare attack it. ' .... I suppose you will soon shove the little men off .. ', Gov of Singapore said to Lt Gen Percival, when he got the news of Japanese amphibious landings in Malaya! The Commonwealth war strategists (for East/Far East) concluded that the main threat from the Japan would be come through sea and either they ignored or even didn't informed well that the Japs could be reach by overland. But the Japanese knew through their Kempeitais' infos that if they ever try to do so then how much dangerous it could be apart from the natural barriers! They did it through air from the north. A strategic victory towards aquiring fuel, tin and rubber of Malaya plus a tactically important base won, the peninsular Malaya.
The British had known since 1938 that a likely Japanese assault would come from the north. In fact a report compiled by the GOC Malaya in 1938 stated that the Japanese would land at Singora and Patani in Thailand, and at Kota Bharu in Malaya and then drive south. This is of course exactly what happend! Badly sited airfields, a very weak airforce, and an army big enough only to defend the State of Johore but tasked with defending the whole country, it was a recipe for disaster, a lot more failures in preperation by the British are involved but the list is just too numerous. To be fair it must also be noted that the Japanese 25th army consisted of the best Japanese divisions, excellent engineer units and was superbly trained, experienced (mostly) and really up for it.
Brigadier Ivan Simson, Chief Engineer Malaya Command at the outbreak of the Pacific war, states in his book "Singapore Too Little Too Late" that even with the Japanese thrusting south through Malaya, the planned installation of scaffolding on the south shore of Singapore Island (to hinder enemy landing craft) went ahead, his request to use this asset on the north shore of the island instead was refused. During this meeting with Percival, Simpson states that he spent 2 hours giving reasons both current and historical why landward defences in Johore and Singapore Island should be built, Percival refused. Percival did however give Simson permission to talk to General Simmons (Singapore Fortress Commander) about starting defences on the north shore of Singapore Island and if Simmons agreed to it then Percival would not object or prevent it. Simmons refused as well, for the usual "defences are bad for morale" reasons. Now Simson also gave a possible reason for this school of thought. It appears that it was felt in WW1 that troops behind formidible defences were reluctant to attack, and as the only way to defeat the enemy is to attack him, strong defences hinder the offensive spirit! This is the first time I have heard a possible explanation for this unbelievable attitude to defences. If this is a credible possibility, it is another example of how London totally ignored what was happening (or not happening) in Malaya as strong defences in depth was all the rage for the British Commanders in North Africa in 1941.
Well, but still I'v to tell a lot of things that happened during 41 ~ 42. I'v noted that the inglorious fate of Singapore Fort as well as Fort Eban Emael, the Czech defences in Sudetenland and the Maginot Line in France had to admit. I think right now we've all the pros and cons of what ... if ... etc. and the similarities are also been observed for their Fates! I think you are well aware about the use of more than 200 tanks deployment by Yamashita, who found the terrain 'suitable' for armoured warfare, when the British were not! He bogged down us here, the Germans almost overran us there in the Ardennes campaign over wooded lands of France. I know that neither you nor me have anything in our hand to defend ourselves except nonstop Excusing ourselves. See, you know the tactical Importance importance of Singapore and it was the birthplace of INA, that gave enough push during Imphal, Kohima and other campaigns during Ha Go and U Go campaigns. Can you imagine what would happen if Mutaguchi's 15th Army overrun Slim's 14th Army, there was no immediate defence line to halt the Japs entering Delhi. Moreover I believe that they threw their gloves for Pearl Harbor and other Pacific island campaigns after taking fresh breath in Malaya. At the moment of the fall of Singapore, we had no chance to send Adm Sir Bruce Fraser GCB, KBE, alongwith his Task Force 57. Had we received Slim and Fraser much earlier, I believe the whole campaign would have been different in the eastern hemisphere. You wrote about 38 ~ 39, but if you look into the history of post Great War, by 19 ~ 20, the British knew the growing strength of Japs navy as well as their Dream of capturing Singapore, and if my memory not betraying me here, the British also knew the Japs will soon challange them. So the fortification was enormous at Singapore. But it required some long term reinforcement but Churchill had been overwhelmed by the threats from u boats and fully devoted in fortification of the 'life-line' - though it had not been noticed during 20s, as the Japs shown! Understandable....
'' .. No surrender can be contemplated ... every inch of ground .. defended, every scrap of material of defences .. blown to pieces to prevent capture by the enemy .. '' Churchill to Wavell (God knows that who promoted This gentleman for Malaya) for Percival. Mutaguchi too, stated almost same verdict and mostly carried out by his men! As far as I believe that alongwith Gov Thomas and Col Dalley (wellknown for his Dalforce) Percival tried to do to some extent had he not intervened in a regular interval by Wavell, who was very new to his Hq in Java, we could do much much better defending Singapore. Wavell was very much Responsible for sending Percival alongwith his men for 'Long March' towards the shade of NISSHOKI! Unbelievable that 30 000 men bogged down some 73 000 equipped allies and almost ever facing any Hard resistance, which had never ever seen in military history of South-east Asia during WW2.
