Did any of you read Ad Harvey's article in BBC History magazine this month; a revisionist view of the Ju87 Stuka? He basically says that their contribution to the Blitzkriegs in Poland, France and the Soviet Union were much exaggerated by Nazi propagandists; that level bombers were better at bombing and the Henschel 123 biplane better at harrassing troops. Its success later in the hands of Rudel etc was as a cannon-armed anti-tank aircraft rather than a dive-bomber. Statistically, all that could very well be true. But what I find difficult to swallow is his assertion that: "Dive-bombing was less accurate than conventional bombing from altitudes of less than 10,000 feet" Surely the whole point of the dive-bomber was its accuracy. The United States Navy pioneered the concept, and Luftwaffe observers of tests were impressed. Would either have continued with the concept without evidence of efficacy? Harvey quotes the sinking of Konigsberg, Gurkha, & Marat as examples of several successful attacks by dive-bombers on ships, requiring great accuracy. Later in the war there was the crippling of Illustrious, the hits on the Tirpitz by Barracudas in the dive-bombing role, and of course any number of such attacks in the Pacific and Mediterranean. Is the key to what he says the 10,000 feet issue - did it take that height for a dive-bomber to stablise in a dive?
I think it was an effective way to do things...if you had good fighter cover and/or the element of surprise. The Stuka proved it was good at its job unless the opposing fighter force got stuck in...but then, it wasn't designed to be a fighter.
Despite what Harvey says, I'm sure more ships were sunk, at least in the open sea, by dive bombers than by level bombers. Hermes, Cornwall and Dorsetshire by Aichi D3A Vals for a start, to say nothing of Pearl Harbour, and PoW and Repulse - and Yamato, later, by a combination of torpedo and dive bombing. It was air-to-ground rockets that made the dive-bomber redundant.
Adrian, I agree with you about the effect of dive-bombing in naval action. Harvey seems to taking a very narrow look at the use of the Stuka, and dive bombers in general. In fact, the use of the Stuka in Channel may lead one to believe that it wasn't very effective against shipping. However, this was more to do with tactics, and the constant intervention of the patrolling RAF than the ineffectiveness of the aircraft. The effect of level bombing against dive-bombing in the French campaign is though, debateable. First off, how does one measure effectiveness? Quantity of disruption per aircraft load, actual destruction of men and equipment, effect on logistics and movement etc? A German level bomber carried a heavier load, and in the circumstances of the withdrawal it played a significant part in disrupting the clogged roads that were full of soldiers and civilians. However, in conjunction with the Panzers, the Stuka was able to destroy significant anounts of equipment, especially artillery hidden in woods and copses. The German tactics involved the Stuka playing the role of mobile artillery, not as a bomber. As a close support weapon, it was never intended to be used in any position too far forward of the front-lines, and was expected to shielded from enemy aircraft by their own fighters. I found this aricle very informative, and a lot more balanced: DIVE-BOMBERS: Trial by Fire Sea Classics - Find Articles
Thanks - an interesting though US-centered article. I'm not sure what he means by the RN using dive-bombing techniques in WW1 - I may ask on one of the WW1 forums if anyone knows about this.
This is certainly an interesting analysis. I'd be interested in people's views. www.usafa.af.mil/df/dfh/docs/Harmon32.doc
I started a thread on the Great War Forum which came to the conclusion that dive-bombing was indeed used in the WW1, bearing in mind that the technique does not have to involve near-vertical dives. 45 degrees is ample to achieve accuracy and speed is not important for the aiming process (only for evading AAA) Dive-Bombing in WW1? - Great War Forum Tieing this in with the Harmon article : it is another example of how the Allies had all the resources of the Germans, and the same or greater quantities, but failed to use them effectively. We never developed dive-bombing properly. Whether the Battles were more vulnerable than Stuka because they were not dive-bombers or because they were not escorted properly is another matter. It is well known that Dowding refused to send many Hurricanes to France - which was right in order to defend the UK if France fell, but if we had sent enough we may have prevented France falling - a huge gamble of course. The French were in logistical chaos - a third of their new Bloch 151 fighters were non-operational due to lack of propellers. We forgot the expertise gained by the "Last Hundred Days" of WW1, when the British Army successfully used combined air, infantry, artillery and tank units, with highly developed communications, in a mobile war that some say was the most successful British military operation ever. In fact we were virtually using Blitzkrieg tactics by then - this was by no means exclusively a German invention. The other day I was at a meeting of Cross and Cockade, the WW1 aviation organisation. Colin Ashford, a leading Aviation artist was present. We talked about digging trenches in the Passchendaele mud in 1917, and Colin said that his regiment was digging trenches in the same area in 1940 (so he must be about 87 by now!) and that as an infantryman he was only taught trench warfare! One French Tank Battalion with Somua cruiser tanks broke out of the static French lines and successfully used Blitzkrieg tactics to push the Germans back in that area some considerable distance, but then they had to withdraw due to lack of support. The commander was one Charles De Gaulle.
