Diptangshu, You try to throw the Manhattan Project onto the ledger on the PTO side, but this is wrong. When the MP was begun it was done so solely as a counter to the projected efforts of Nazi Germany, e.g. the ETO. Little to no thought was given to Japanese atomic energy. In fact the Japanese had only small research amounts of Uranium and could not have made even an experimental atomic pile or chain reaction. They hoped to get an enormous boost in material from U-234 being sent to Japan in early 1945. It was in the Indian Ocean when news of Germany's surrender reached them. On board was several tonnes of U-235 as well as blueprints and documentation. The two Japanese nationals committed suicide rather than surrender with the crew of the U-234. After May 1945 there was no more combat in Europe. Any expediture for May-August must be dismissed.
Very authentic and impresive thread, R Leonard! Anyway for the Last time I gonna clear my Objectives/POVs, points of view.. * I'm counting the Heads of the personnel deployed in the ETO/PTO/MTO or ATO since it is widely known that Differs. * US efforts to PTO was more Expensive, costly by 2Ms, materials and money - contributed by the citizens. * Since the starter mentioned ' whole war ', so I just cant help mentioning Manhattan Project ('41 - '45 time span), because it brought closer the V Day and SAVED over 1milion American. Let me show the COST Variation for both the ETO - PTO. Consider the map of the both and calculate the operational area, extention, this is Very Important to understand/calculate the Load Distribution. In this regard one should understand the cost price has a direct relation to the Distance you gonna carry. Eg., For a JKF - LHR (Heathrow/Trans Atlantic) flight your favorite air liner charges X usd, but if you Extend it upto say Ninoy Aquino (Manila/Trans Pacific), the same liner 'll cost you X + usd! Let's take some incidents from the PTO, which 'll provide a better knowledge regarding this. Contributions of the US subs in the PTO, under the Directives-Dec '41 : ''Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan''. Get the data as/tons (over 500) > % of total :- Subs - 4,861,300 : 54.64 Navy carrier Air - 1,452,900 : 16.33 Army Air - 910,100 : 10.23 Navy Land Based Air - 383,200 : 14.49 Others - 1,289,500 : 14.49 TOTAL - 8,897,000 : 100% [NB : Allied Contributions to be deducted as the above order to get Final USs' ] - 2%; 12%; 23%. This COSTS against 25-27% of Fuel comparing to the ETO patroling. The Observation (costing) 'll remain almose same for the other US forces within the same locations. Another data - During the time span of June - Dec '42, the total measurment tons of cargo delivered per 'deadweight' ton of shipping was 0.42 in the PTO. In the same time span there was 3.3 deadweight tons of shipping in the PTO for each US soldier deployed against Japan .... and THIS was 2.5 TIMES OF THE SHIPPING REQ TO SUPPORT THE EQUIVALENT MANPOWER IN ETO. Another data - Total fuel oil issue in the PTO was 17,000,000 barrels in '42 and 28,000,000 barrels in '43; expenditure (in terms of COST) continued to CLIMB as the US offensive rolled forward there in the PTO. http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/L/o/Logistics.html The Seabee Battalions : http://www.seabees93.net/GI Naval Construction Battalions.htm One more dirty data of the US effort - by Dec '43, the Balance was nearly came close though not exeeded (giving in brief since I'm less interested for head counting) > US against Japan : men - 1,873,023 ; aeroplanes - 7857 ; warships - 713 . US against Germany : men - 1,810,367 ; aeroplanes - 8807 ; warships - 515. [COST ratio but shows in an ever increasing manner ie., 3:1 ; 5:1 likewise in general]. A small but good notable account of The US ARMY SMALL SHIPS : http://www.usarmysmallships.asn.au/html/form_doc.html I also have mechanical datas (fuel consumption) for some battleships , some of aeroplanes and vehicles. Thank you .. Diptangshu
@Interrogator#6, as I've seen the MP - COST/Expenditure report [US/'42-'45 ~ Statistics Branch Controll Division, HQ-Army Service Force/War Dept], I found nowhere that They ' T H R O W ' it Out of the US war effort .... since the starter told us for Total War and as far as my knowledge goes, US reached Japan through PTO and The Combined Force had done their best since the Objective was to reach Tokyo! On July 29, '45, Japan rejected the Potsdam Proclamation. I hardly bother wheather anyone dismiss my thread as I've not written anything here on Korean conflicts! Remember that $ 76 million expenced by USAAF (509th composit bomb group-Tinian Island) in Project Silverplate, on the modification of 46 B-29 bombers in SUPPORT of the MP. Apart from the crafts modification, the group Trained their personnels and Improved the Logistical supports on the island. Thanks.
This will be a two part posting due to the 10K character/space limit of this forum Part I I have stalled on responding to the last post, but eventually decided that (a) failure to respond was rather impolite and (b) even so, a failure to respond might be construed as acquiescence or agreement, of which I have neither. You seem to want to quantify the efforts by US forces during WW2 against the Japanese Empire versus against Germany, and for a while, anyway, Italy (hereafter I will simply use “Germany” or “German” or the theaters shorthand “EAME”) in terms of some monetary cost. You semi present the US naval efforts and the cost of fuel operationally and over the distances in the Pacific and you specifically raise the presence of Naval Construction Battalions as examples of leading you theorized preponderance of effort=cost of operations against the Japanese versus the against Germany. Your argument is, at best, one sided. You present this that or the other reason why the Pacific was more, if you will, expensive, yet you have apparently not made an in depth analysis of the efforts against Japan and, more telling, offer no example of the cost of the effort against Germany. Let us examine some of the issues . . . We know for example that there were three US Army combat divisions operating against the Germany for every US Army combat division operating against the Japanese. If you wish to present the cost of sustaining the divisions (and just for the heck of it we’ll include the USMC combat divisions, the 3:1 ratio will remain intact) as strictly a fuel issue, then that is a path you might not want to take. All these troops, regardless of theater, need to be sustained; that is supplied. Though possibly somewhat of anachronism, the most generally classes of supply fall into some general categories: Class I – rations, subsistence Class II – expendable equipment and clothing Class II – petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) Class IV – construction material Class V – munitions – from bullets to bombs and everything in between Class VI – personal care, non-military items Class VII – major equipment (tanks, truck, airplanes, things that roll or fly or that repair things that roll or fly) Class VII– medical equipment and supplies including subcategories for consumables and blood products Class IX – repair parts, mostly related to Class VII items There is a Class X, but it refers to supplies for non-military programs, so I don’t think we need to worry about it, it was not a big worry during the actual fighting WW2. Importantly, nearly 100% of these supplies were sourced in the United States and were carried to the end users in ships for distribution, Atlantic and Pacific. With three times the number of divisions on the ground against Germany, it would follow that they would need to be supplied at three times the rate as the divisions against the Japanese. Further, it would do well to remember that the fighting in Europe and Africa was along fronts, with continuous actions, literally, for months on end, rather that series of landings which, except for larger islands such as one finds in the Philippines or, perhaps, Guadalcanal, generally resulted in short termed campaigns followed by periods of respite. It would follow then that supply to the divisions operating against Germany not only required MORE supply as a function of numbers, but MORE OF IT as a function of operations. It would also do well think about a comparison between the number of armor divisions in the EAME theaters versus the number in the Pacific. Here’s a hint . . . in the Pacific, armor units were measured in battalions, not divisions. Air operations exhibit the same dichotomy. A quick analysis of USAAF order of battle reveals, up to the German capitulation, that there had been about 712 squadrons operating in the EAME theaters, 354 against Japan (including Alaska and the CBI) and still another 478 operating primarily in the American theater (though some were involved in antisubmarine, mostly against the U-Boat threat). This count includes all types, bombardment, reconnaissance, fighter, troop carrier, cargo carrier, liaison and whatever. We can quickly see that AAF squadrons in the EAME theaters outnumbered squadrons against Japan by slightly better than 2:1. Squadrons against Japan were outnumbered those in the American Theater by better than 1.3:1. Overall, operating squadrons’ theaters of operations were roughly: Japan – 23%, EAME – 46% and American theater – 31%. Looking just at those in the two main combat theaters, the percentages were, against Japan – 33%, against Germany – 67%. As with the ground units, these squadrons (and their various headquarters commands) had also need of sustainment from the same list, obviously at a rate of at least 2:1 EAME to Japan. Obviously, large four engine types could move themselves about, but anything smaller was pretty much reduced to travel by sea . . . and someone to unload them, and when necessary, someone to put them together at the other end of the trip (mostly in EAME as the USN had, by mid-1944 anywhere from 20 to 26 CVEs available for aircraft transport on an on-going basis, though most, most, not all, AAF aircraft units availing themselves of this service generally were off loaded pier or barge side, not flown off. Bombs, how many tons of bombs were dropped by the USAAF on EAME targets versus Japanese? Well, according to the USAAF statistical digest, against EAME targets, about 1,554,463 tons of ordnance dropped; against Japan, about a third less, 502,871. You can add the total USN ordnance tonnage to the AAAF against Japan total, but it will still come out mess than the USAAF EAME total – 502,871 AAF tons plus 117,751 USN comes to 620,622 tons of ordnance, against Japan . . . the EAME theater USAAF total is still 2.5 times greater. But remember, almost each and every one, every bomb, every rocket, every bullet, regardless of theater was transported by ship before going to the delivering unit, be it a four engine bomber or a single engine fighter. Which, of course, means that at least 2.5 times the number of bombs were shipped to the EAME as to the Pacific in however many ships making however many trips. And from whence did all these AAF aircraft operate? As the USN had its construction battalions (more later) so did the USAAF, they were Aviation Engineer Battalions. In the course of the war, not counting construction/reconstruction in North Africa and Italy, these units either constructed or returned to operational status approximately 296 airfields across Europe, not to mention the field built or expanded in Great Britain (38 new fields, and some 60 plus expanded). One might want to compare that to, I believe, 111 airfields either constructed or returned to operational status by the USN construction battalions. I will not even get into the US Army Corps of Engineers, independent battalions, regiments, and brigades, working all over the world, but mostly in Europe, restoring road networks and rail lines. And let us not forget that each of those army combat divisions, EAME or Pacific, each had its own organic engineer battalion. I believe you have forgotten Lend-Lease. The dollar value of just US War Department transfers of Lend-lease material and equipment for all purposes came to roughly $23,531,670,000, below, and does NOT include the lend-lease of naval related items. Most of War Department sourced lend-lease went to Europe (as did most of the Naval, as well). So, here are some dollar figures into which one can sink one’s teeth, however, the numbers do not show the cost of transport) British Empire = $13,769,876,000 or 58.5% USSR = $5,530,616,000 or 23.5% French Forces = $1,854,956,000 or 7.9% China = $1,626,876,000 or 6.9% Brazil = $221,598,000 or 0.9% Other Latin America = $84,575,000 or 0.45 Canada = $169,612,000 or 0.7% Netherlands = $96,127,000 or 0.4% Other Countries = $56,709,000 or 0.2% Not distributed = $120,725,000 or 0.5% I will let you guestimate the percentage of the values that went towards the defeat of Germany as opposed to Japan. End of Part I
Continuing with Part II . . . Ah, and now, the SeaBees. There were 150 Naval Construction Battalions, 39 Special Naval Construction Battalions (stevedoring activities), 116 Naval Construction Battalion Detachments, 133 Naval Construction Battalion Maintenance Units and where a sufficient number of these existed on place, Naval Construction Regiments (53) and even Naval Construction Brigades (12). There were also 5 Naval Pontoon Assembly Detachments. All these came to about 350,000 men. But, something you seemed to have missed, not all of them were in the Pacific. First of all, about 10% never left the US. Others served all over the world, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and, yes, in deed and in truth, in Europe. You should research the number of SeaBee units involved in the various invasions of the European continent and the restoration of captured ports. I would hazard you would be surprised to learn there was at least one Construction Battalion on the ground and working in Germany by the beginning of April 1945. Official SeaBee histories are available on the web; about 7,450 pages altogether, help yourself. Oddly enough, as a child in the early 1960’s, I lived at the CinCLant/SacLant headquarters in Norfolk, VA, separated by a small Marine Corps garrison (Camp Elmore) from the original SeaBee training base, Camp Allen. Your references to the Manhattan Project have been correctly identified as mis-applied. You seem to want to disregard that the primary target all along was Germany, mostly because it was, we know now erroneously, suspected that they were also in the race for a bomb. One might suppose that the Japanese, simply by virtue of being the last Axis country standing (perhaps the result of an effort less than that applied to Germany), had the bad luck to be the recipients. Further, as has also been mentioned, anything happening after the surrender of Nazi Germany in May 1945 really does not count as the war effort of the US is by default focused solely on Japan. And lastly, the ultimate destruction of the Japanese navy and the vessels of its merchant ship inventory at the hands of USN navy surface and undersea warships, USN, USMC and USAAF aircraft, RN and commonwealth surface and undersea warships and aircraft, RAF and commonwealth aircraft and RNN submarines was possible because the targets existed in the first place. You cannot compare the elimination of these Japanese ships with action against Germany as the Germans had no where near comparable numbers - the German merchant fleet went away, sunk, captured or interned very early in the game and long before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Certainly, Germany had a large U-Boat fleet, but by 1944 the game was up for them . . . which lead to a reminder that a not insignificant portion of the USN’s surface and air assets were involved in convoying and ASW operations in the Atlantic, far, far away from the Japanese. I’ll be clear. I really don’t care a fig about the war in Europe, the EAME theaters. My field of interest is the Pacific and specifically US naval aviation therein, but, sir, you are mistaken and your arguments are simply distracters. Anywhere from 2 thirds to 3 quarters (depending what and how you wish to measure) of the US effort, personnel and their necessary supplies and implements to do the job, not to mention blood, were expended in the EAME theaters against Germany as was against the Japanese. Oh, and no, no links. Everything I’ve written can be had with some judicious googling. I’ve spent literally years collecting thousands of documents and studies . . . I won’t go back and point to them now. I will suggest you visit the Combined Arms Research Library, the USAF WW2 Numbered Studies, the Hyperwar site, and the USN Historical Command (for example, the SeaBee unit histories), just as starting points.
Regarding the Europe First, ARE you sure for it maintained Strictly THROUGHOUT ? ''....... 80% of my time was given to logistics during the first four monthsof the Watchtower operations, because we were living from one logistics crisis to another......" ~ Adm Richmond K Turner. "....... Naval planning and operations to date have demonstrated a define Lack of appreciation of Logistic factor and as a consequence, operations to date have lacked continuity by reason of the Shortage of essential supplies and installetions to support military operations......' ~ Gen Arnold reported to Gen Marshall ('42). Inspite of EF (Europe First), strategy Roosevelt had no choice but to ensure WATCHTOWER's success(otherwise it would have ment political suicide for Him). Consideing the problem of combat losses, however, it simply took MORE shipping in the PTO. One may recall this ... a force of 40,000 prsonnel required nearly as much shipping as a force of 100,000 if they 've to fight in PTO., BECAUSE of the great distance.... '' ...... The great problem of warfarein the Pacific is to more forces into constract and maintain them...Victory is Dependent upon the Solution of the Logistis problem...." ~ Mac Arthur Landings on Guam, Saipan, Tinian etc., took place on 15th June'44(ie., 9 days behind Normandy Landings), the force(535 ps, 127,5000 personnel)was staged from Eniwetok Atol, 1000 miles away planning phase done from Pearl Harbor, some 3,600 miles away, took only three months because a very good no of landing crafts Diverted From ETO(!), eventually had forced the Delay of the Landings in southern France by 30 days, untill Aug"44. The assult force(US) landed on Okinawa, consisting of 183,000 personnel carried in 430 ships and crafts including 748,000 mesrmnt tonns of logistics staged from Ullithi Atol, Eniwetok, Saipan and Leyte.By calculating the Distance, one may do the simle math to get operational cost for each of the Island campaign. Near'bout 5,865,000 mesrmnt tonns of shipping(Mar'42) had been swelled to 10,725,000 mesrmnt tons (Feb'43), so the effort behind this as well as Cost of it be calculated under shipping Charges (contemporary). In Dec'42, for the PTO 358 supply ships were available to serve. During Iwo Jima campaign, Service Sq 6 (Beary) delivered 2,787000 barrels fuel oil(BFO) 7,126,000 gallons of fuel oil(GFO) and 1,05,000 barrels of diesel oil(BDO). During Okinawa campaign : 10,133,000 BFO 323,000 BDO 252,573,000 GFO 16,375 tons of ammos 998 replacement aircrafts 220 replacement air crews 2219 tons of refrigerated provis 4,005 tons of dry provis 575 tons of shipstores 15398 bags of mail 1032 replecement (only) ersonnel. So, what 'll be the Cost price (difference) in $ million had the same operated in the ETO, rather than PTO? I'm no fan of ETO, PTO OR SOMETHING like, instead of Love towards parallel studies, data lover etc or something like that.. I want to point out some infos on the Distances that US had to cover in the PTO, something like .... * Only Philippines contatains some 7,000 isls .. ** Considering Tarawa as a base, Pearl Harbor was 2,100 kmiles! *** One may recall here the Distance between Tinian to Japan's main Island !! For getting some ideas regarding Fuel Consumptins here (PTO) are some datas for the BB Class: http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/Fuel/Fuel-BB.html A rough calculation : Army fuel allocation for France('44) was 5,000 gal/day for an infantry dv.and 25,000 gal for mech dv. or take some rough calcus like : say 15,000 gal/day x 3 dv/corps x 3 corps/field army x 180 days = 24,300,000 gals/6 months. BUT a single campaign in the PTO, Consumed of this much of Fuel. Only the Red Ball Exp ate up eqivallent Of Fuel Consumed by Patton's 8th Army!! Some datas regarding Fuel consumption : Ship name : Yamato Crews : 2700 Dsplcmnt : 72,8000 tons Range Radious : 11,500 kmiles Power plant : 153,553 hp, produced by 12 Kanpon boilers driving 4 turbines Speed : 16 knots with the help of 3 props (6meter dia of each) Fuel Consumption : 70 (seventy) tons of fuel oil/hr ... !! Compare with you car .... you can drive for some 1 million mile, like 30 times around the earth in 1 HOUR only !! US in the PTO ..... the MORE YOU TELLLLLLL, seems that Recalling verrrrrry little to THEIR EFFORT!!
@ R Leonard, you may have more datas regarding that LL Programme (which reallly I'v vey lill), but one thing I'm sure for that , the programme was somehow Earned Something....but Campaign in the PTO, Brought No Money....but G L O R Y Y Y Y... Recall for one more time : US Merchant marine loss in PTO.... http://usmm.org/pacific.html
Another two parter due to character count limitations . . . Part the first: You are, of course, cherry picking. You provide the quote: '''....... 80% of my time was given to logistics during the first four months of the Watchtower operations, because we were living from one logistics crisis to another......’ ~ Adm Richmond K Turner.” Of course Admiral Turner was spending most of his time on Operation Watchtower in 1942, no surprise, as it was his job. He really had no concern over EAME operations and it’s supply chain except, I am sure, in the back of his mind, some even more unkind, he was a remarkably unkind man, and choice words about the lack of resources to do his job the way he really wanted to do it, rather than what assets and resources he had at his command. This commentary was on the LACK of logistic support . . . hardly what one might pen if one’s forces were getting the preponderance of support. Then you provide: "’....... Naval planning and operations to date have demonstrated a define Lack of appreciation of Logistic factor and as a consequence, operations to date have lacked continuity by reason of the Shortage of essential supplies and installetions to support military operations......' ~ Gen Arnold reported to Gen Marshall ('42). “ You should be careful what you quote . . . Arnold is decrying the shortage of supply and installations in the Pacific, not on any plentitude. And Arnold, himself, was miserly in supplying the 5th and 7th Air Forces until well into 1943 . . . The USAAF buildup in EAME came first. Neither of your leading quotes proves a thing nor provides any evidence of your claim that the majority of the US war effort was in the Pacific. The both are, in fact, commentaries on the dearth of supplies and installations in the Pacific. Here is a much better quote. This is from Army, the magazine of the Association of the US Army, in its April 2013 issue, in an article by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, USA (Ret), PhD, former professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, entitled “Pacific War- Forgotten Theater.” See: http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2013/04/Pages/default.aspx Scroll down to the features section and find the title cited and it will link you to a pdf of the article. COL Kingseed writes: “. . . Though the Navy dedicated roughly 70 percent of its resources and the entire Marine Corps to the Pacific, only 37 percent of the Army and Army Air Forces saw wartime service across the broad expanse of the Pacific Ocean and its adjacent waters . . .” Lucky me, I have both a degree in history (from an obscure military college in Virginia, same one as George Marshall and a few others I could mention) and an MBA with a specialty in operations analysis. I can recognize voodoo accounting and basic errors and omissions in theory. This I do this for a living . . . and I make a good living. I regret that you may be a “data lover,” but you are not very good at analysis. That is, you only look at one side; you don’t look for nor do you present matching data on the other. Go figure . . . you say, for example, during the Iwo Jima campaign, ServRon6 delivered: “10,133,000 BFO “323,000 BDO “252,573,000 GFO “16,375 tons of ammos “998 replacement aircrafts “220 replacement air crews “2219 tons of refrigerated provisions “4,005 tons of dry provisions “575 tons of ship stores “5398 bags of mail “1032 replacement (only) personnel “ Okay, I believe you . . . now, in these same categories, go find out how much was delivered to the remaining US forces, all of them, Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, in the Pacific theaters, say from 1 February 1945 to 1 April 1945. Add those together. Now for all the US forces, Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in the EAME theaters, find the same numbers for the same period . . . now you have a basis for comparison. Presenting one sided factoids, that is, facts without any measurable comparison, does not bolster your argument. Find the comparable data and report back. I mean really . . . what was ServRonSoPacFor doing? What about ServRon8? ServRon10? ServRon12? And their EAME counterparts, such as ServRon1 or Servon5 or ServRon7. Presenting but one as your argument tells us nothing. You write: “A rough calculation : Army fuel allocation for France('44) was 5,000 gal/day for an infantry dv.and 25,000 gal for mech dv. or take some rough calcus like : say 15,000 gal/day x 3 dv/corps x 3 corps/field army x 180 days = 24,300,000 gals/6 months. BUT a single campaign in the PTO, Consumed of this much of Fuel. Only the Red Ball Exp ate up eqivallent Of Fuel Consumed by Patton's 8th Army!!” So rough as to be nonsense. Where are you getting these numbers, certainly not from any logistics tables I’ve ever seen . . . You are making an unsupported calculation on the EAME theater and then blithely announce, without showing anything to compare, that the PTO consumed more in one campaign. ( - - Which begs another comparison, do you mean like the securing of, say, Makin or are you referring so something somewhat larger, such as Luzon? And , oh, by the by, the US did not even attempt, and nor did the Japanese for that matter, to land troops on all those 7000 plus islands in the Philippine archipelago which you mention - most of which are uninhabited on a year around basis - your tossing out of that little snip of a factoid was just another distracter. - - ) Consumption of fuel to move supplies and even more fuel was part and parcel of the cost of doing business. You cannot count the cost of doing business in the Pacific, e.g., moving ships from here to there, and then not count the cost of supplying the armies in the EAME, even to the almost endless chain of tankers in convoy after convoy across the Atlantic. George Patton, by the way, commanded the 3rd Army, not the 8th. End Part One
Part the second . . . Here’s some light reading for you, from the official US Army histories of World War II (all of which are available on line from the US Army Center of Military History. See http://www.history.army.mil/index.html If you go to the WWII portion of the above site http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/usaww2.html You can click on any of the selections and see the titles. May I suggest that you look at least at the following: In the European Theater of Operations section Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941-September 1944 Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II: September 1944-May 1945 The Middle East Theater The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia The Corps of Engineers Troops and Equipment Construction in the United States The War Against Germany The War Against Japan The Medical Department Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations Medical Service in the War Against Japan The Ordnance Department Planning Munitions for War Procurement and Supply On Beachhead and Battlefront The Quartermaster Department Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II Operations in the War Against Japan Operations in the War Against Germany The Transportation Department Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations Movements, Training, and Supply Operations Overseas Special Studies Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb You might also try to avoid dragging the merchant marine losses into the picture . . . that would be a mistake. You seem to have jumped to a conclusion, apparently based on the relative size of the Pacific Ocean and opposed to the Atlantic. It was not a good conclusion. If you were to examine the US merchant shipping damaged or lost (and I did so years ago, it was really very easy) you would find that, and leaving out those in waters along the east, southern and west coasts of the US (the American Theater) where a given vessel’s ultimate destination might not be particularly clear (even though most of the ships lost, and not inconsiderable number of those damaged, on the US east coast, the in Caribbean and in the Gulf of Mexico can be directly attributed to German U-Boats) some 2.6 times plus more shipping, damaged or lost, were related to the EAME theater waters than to the Pacific. There was, in fact, more such shipping the waters of the American Theater than in the Pacific Theater. (I could show you where to get the data and how to perform the analysis, ship by ship, loss by loss, or I could even give you my data, but I will do neither. I am a firm believer in the theory that if you figure it out by yourself you will become a smarter, wiser and more satisfied person.) Bottom line, merchant ship casualties are not a good example to use if you want to prove a preponderance of US effort in the Pacific as, in fact, they show exactly the opposite. And have you noticed how those similar ratios of EAME to Pacific keep reappearing? Such as 3 to 1 USA combat divisions; 2 to 1 in AAF combat squadrons; 2.6 to 1 merchant casualties; 3 to 1 overall combat casualties; 2.5 tons of ordnance target delivered EAME to Pacific . . . you don’t suppose there is any significance to those ratios, do you? And our friend COL Kingseed’s 37% to the Pacific, which, of course, means 63% went somewhere else, like, maybe, the EAME theaters . . . not quite 2:1, but it is close. Looking at both sides of the picture, as alluded above, seems to give us a recurring basic comparison. Your repeated interjections of Japanese losses or the Japanese cost of doing their naval or military business are irrelevant to the question of the higher expenditure of effort by the US, Pacific or EAME . . . it would be equivalent to presenting the number of town and cities in Germany wiped by either aerial bombardment or ground fire. What happens to the other side is irrelevant to your basic economic theory of Pacific preponderance of effort. The recitations of the cost to the Japanese do not matter. The results of US and Allied operations against the Japanese do not matter unless you are trying, and you are not, or at least have not tried, to determine some vague return on investment. Here, I can make it simple: The simple and salient fact which you which you seem to want to, but cannot avoid or ignore, is that in the US war effort, three plus times the number of personnel were in the EAME as were in the Pacific (and one might point out that in terms of US casualties, the same ratio applied). Depending what you want to count, with the acknowledged preponderance of US naval assets – but certainly not all of those assets being in the Pacific, anywhere from two to three times of almost any other commodity or operational unit were in EAME as in the Pacific. Anyway you want to try to spin the data; it takes more effort to support 3, or even but 2, of anything than it does to support 1 of the same thing, to refer back to an earlier post, note the difference between armor battalions in the Pacific versus armor divisions in the EAME. I would suggest that rather than quote mine and cherry pick information on the Pacific theaters and then throw what you find out as some sort of vindication that you look at BOTH theaters, EAME and Pacific, and make like to like comparisons. It is very obvious that you are not at all looking at the EAME theaters. When you are done, come back and tell us what you have discovered. This claim of the preponderance of US effort being in the Pacific theaters as opposed to the EAME theaters is yours . . . you need to prove it. One sided lists and numbers without comparative data are meaningless. You never know, you might even convince me, but one sided snippet reporting does not and never will.
It Was A Typing Mistake From My End and Thanks for escalating the 3rd Army. * On occation of 'Europe First', quotes had been provided. * I've already mentioned for the Merchant Marine loss (US) in the PTO. * Loss of personnel, wherever it may be, is beyond any cost. * Every Struggle against ANY obnoxous regime is Honored. * DIFFERENCES between Armored warfare and Naval warfare (tactical, cost as well as effort) tends to go Higher for the second one. * Writing the consumption of Yamato, was an eg. to get general Idea to understand the operating cost of a ship during WW2. * I haven't Discovered anything which have to staged here instead I shared my 'datas', I didn't even Bother for Others Liking, LOL. * I HATE SELF PROMOTION as well as least Interested about what One/other is Doing. When others' knowledge reflects through their infos, which will be enough for me to Understand The Person and not by telling .... I'm this .. I'm that! ** Never ever Demanded to others to take my datas. ** US effort/struggle etc. had been Higher during WW2, for the PTO, as far as my point of view is concerned.
I think it would most likely be Japanese since they are the ones that actually attacked us. If we would have let that slide, then yeah we all would have been Japanese by now.
Obviously the US could not "let that slide". On the other hand, the Japanese had neither the fleet train nor the manpower to invade, much less, sustain an invasion, of the US, or even just Hawaii, so there was never a chance of that happening. There are those who claim an invasion of Hawaii circa 10 December 41 would have been successful, but the realities of the situation in the clear light of capabilities and terrain quickly make that a fantasy. And what would they have gained? Nothing . . . what they wanted were resources, oil, rubber, tin, what-not, all found in southeast Asia and the Netherlands East Indies and none of which could be found in the Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii, even under the US could not support itself, most everything was brought in by sea. Imagine the Japanese trying to support that . . . another non-starter. They had some clear heads who recognized that the problem would be insurmountable. The Japanese, despite their early successes, went to war with a faulty long term plan, however nebulous, and never stood a chance of emerging victorious. If ever a nation underestimated the resolve of its adversary this was it. I mean, really, with a million plus men bogged down in a war in China that it was becoming apparent would go on forever, they turn around a strike the largest industrial power in the world and expect to win. Good thinking, that.
