Pearl Harbor, an exercise in ignorance?

Jack: I have been reading a number of books lately about the ETO and come away impressed anew with German prowess in warfare, which dates back even before their overthrow of the Roman Empire after luxury and corruption had sapped its strength. It took the British, the Russians (who inflicted nine of ten of the German battlefield deaths) and us in concert with a collection of lesser powers to beat them in World War II.
I was also struck by the low opinion of British military ability privately held by their leadership. Max Boot writes in Winston’s War, “Again and again Churchill pressed General Wavell, and indeed all his generals, to overcome their fears of the enemy, to display the fighting spirit which he prized above all things, and which alone, he believed, would enable Britain to survive.” Left to their own, Boot adds, the generals would have accepted battle only on their own favorable terms, which describes Montgomery’s career in a nutshell. Wavell told a friend, “My trouble is I am not really interested in war.” Adds Boot: “This was a surprisingly common limitation among Britain’s senior soldiers.” At another point, he laments that “they were agreeable men who lacked the killer instinct indispensable to victory.”
After Wavell was replaced in Egypt by General Claude Auchinleck, the dismal story continued. Despite a three-to-one advantage in tanks and a greater mechanized mobility, the British were defeated again. B.H. Liddell Hart in his History of the Second World War quotes Rommel’s scornful comment about British tank tactics: “What difference does it make if you have two tanks to my one, when you spread them out and let me smash them in detail? You presented me with three brigades in succession.” Alexander Cadogan, second in command of the Foreign Office, wrote in his diary, “Our soldiers are the most pathetic amateurs, pitted against professionals . . . The Germans are magnificent fighters and their Staff are veritable Masters of Warfare.” He added, “Our army is the mockery of the world.” After Dunkirk and another larger evacuation from France two weeks later, the British people were shaken and a wave of defeatism swept the country. “Examples of such defeatism were the suggestions from within Government to evacuate the Royal Family and Government to another part of the Overseas Empire, send priceless paintings from London’s National Gallery to Canada, and even evacuate British children to Canada and the US. [36] The US also facilitated this defeatist mentality by attaching a clause to its transfer of US destroyers that in the event of German victory, the British Fleet should be transferred to America. [37] The mere mention of this possibility elicited a response from Churchill to Roosevelt that said “such a discussion, perhaps on the eve of an invasion, would be injurious to public morale.” -- Carl J. Ciovacco
WWI's carnage obliterated God knows how much generational talent and genius and no doubt contributed to the caution of IGS. Yet there was an understanding among many junior officers coming up that future wars would be ones of maneuver. British inter-war military exercises to develop tactics were closely studied by the German general staff and by another far-sighted warrior, Charles de Gaulle. Churchill, who had himself played an early role in experimenting with tanks, admitted in his memoirs that he forgotten all that, and the senior military leadership never learned it.
The British had a saying through the course of empire to explain how they survived all of the bungling . “We lose every battle but the last one.”

http://www.amazon.com/The-Great-Lia...=1406465816&sr=8-1&keywords=jerry jay carroll

 

Total pish the point you are missing is that whilst the Germans were building an army, and building ships as if they were going out of fashion the British, French and other allies were adhering to the gentlemans contract known as the Treaty of Versaille, so when we were called upon to fight, we were doing so with most outdated equipment.
We were also fed the wrong information by Chamberlain for almost two years, because of his meetings with Herr Hitler, had we re-armed and progressed when Germany were, we would have been more ready for a war, that we tried to ensure would never happen.

You say all this about the German army, but fail to mention that it overstretched itself, and by the turn of 1943-44 was relying on reserves made up of 15 - 17 yr olds and pensioners to boost it's numbers.

As for the desert campaign, maybe you are right, but once Montgomery took control, the "superior" German forces were pushed back so far they had their backs to the sea.

One thing we do agree on is that the "last battle is the most important one to win".

There is also a memorable quote from the signal by the Germans on DDay to German high command, the reply to how many ships the spotter could see was, "they don't have that many ships" to which the radio operator replied "they do now".

As for a wave of defeatism sweeping the country after Dunkirk, I've never read so much bullshit, I have no idea where you are from, but I am guessing the States, if anything Dunkirk welded this country together in way which was never seen before, and hasn't been since, all through that part of the blitz, the British people were prepared to fight the Germans to last man in every village should they have to, and if you look carefully around the southern villages of Britain today, there is still evidence of that resolve. 60 and 70 yr old men, veterans of WW1 prepared to fight for Britain on British soil, and to die if needed.

 

Japanese were pretty ruthless in WWII. Koreans still harbor a resentment towards them after what happened at Nanking.

 

Jack: Hang on, I hope I haven’t given the impression I have less than the greatest respect for the English (as they were they known then) in WWII. They stood alone against the greatest threat in history to Western civilization, an evil that would have enveloped the world were it not for their endurance and courage coupled with the lunacy Hitler was guilty of in attacking the Soviet Union and then declaring war on the U.S. after Pearl Harbor. It does the English no discredit to say they feared defeat in the early dark days. After Dunkirk, men armed only with pikes and fowling pieces guarded rural airfields where the 10,000 paratroopers Hitler had at his disposal might have landed at any time. It is only when you conquer fear that you become heroic and historic, like the Greeks at Thermopylae, and under Churchill that is what happened after nerves were steadied.
He began to warn of Germany’s menace as far back as 1930 when Ramsay MacDonald was prime minister, and continued through Stanley Baldwin’s premiership. By Chamberlain’s time, the damage of head-in-the-sand policy was done, and the Third Reich had a long lead. (But not in ship building, as you said – Hitler didn’t think a powerful navy was important). In the later stages of the war you mention, the Wehrmacht had to rely on old men and beardless youths because the Russians, while taking appalling losses themselves, had ground it to hamburger. German officers who were punished by assignment for whatever reason to the Eastern front regarded it as tantamount to a death sentence.

http://www.amazon.com/The-Great-Liars-They-knew/dp/0989826902/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1406465816&sr=8-1&keywords=jerry jay carroll

 

It was Chinese who were slaughtered at Nanking, not Koreans. Unlike the credulous cranks and crackpots who spend time hovering here waiting to pounce on supposed errors, I won’t assume that mistake was a deliberate effort to mislead in support of some agenda.

http://www.amazon.com/The-Great-Lia...=1406465816&sr=8-1&keywords=jerry jay carroll

 

The point about Montgomery fighting on his "own terms" is a good one, and it is significant to note that whilst the Allies were holed up for a long time in North Africa, Montgomery had the patience to wait until everything was in place before taking on the might of Rommel, this included blockading of the German supplies in the Med, and doing it well, until as at the Bulge, Germany had overstretched and the supplies were not getting through, then and only then did Montgomery instill the final assaults and drive the Germans back. Much like Agincourt where the French knights were sucked in to the range of the English archers and were picked off like apples in a barrel.

 

Sorry I just joined this blog yesterday and the posts are very interesting indeed!! Although I have no information to add to the current discussion, I would like to recommend a book written by someone in the Japanese Embassy in Washington about events 24 hours before the Pearl Harbour attack titled : "Japan's Longest Day". It showed there were many in the Japanese diplomatic corps who were against bringing the US into the war. Alas the military faction was too strong and the attack took place.
Andy - Singapore

 

Hello Andy, KopiOhPeng, and welcome to the discussion.

I do not recall reading "Japan's Longest Day". Can you furnish Author or Publisher? Date of publication?

Your comment has stirred my little grey cells into action. It is well known the 14-part message told the diplomats in Washington, DC, to deliver the final message at a time shortly before the PH attack, but due to the "lack of a typist" delayed delivery. Also there was a party at the Japanese Embassy the night before, ostensively to honour someone returning to Japan.

I just had the original thought: What if the delay was deliberate on the part of the Japanese diplomates/functionaries? It is reasonably well known by persons who understand Japanese psychology that one viable option that powerless juniors might take to influence Grand Actions which the vehemently oppose is to take subtle passive-aggressive action, such as self sacrifice or sabotage. Could the delay of the delivery have been DELIBERATE? Knowing that a sneak-attack might rouse the Americans to action might be seen as the only way for Japanese citizen/diplomat to defeat the Military/Naval bloc in their own government.

This is a very subtile ploy which seems possible in the light of GO (a Japanese strategy game played on a 19 by19 grid).

 

I think that we could have been better prepared for an attack, if we had decided to get into the war sooner. We were way too laxed about the whole thing. I think that we truly underestimated the severity of the situation. Now as far as the British warning us, and all of that, I'm not sure if that's true, but what I can say is that knowing that there was a war going on, we should have been more vigilant.

 

How much, Nailah, do you really know of the situation in America in the years 1938-1941(7 Dec.)?

I ask because there was a lot being done both centre-stage and behind the scenes. Many writers have pointed out that FDR wanted to enter the war as an ally of the UK, going to far as to bend the rules in the Battle of the Atlantic (firing on U-boats). The US also was attempting to bend the rules in the Pacific (AVF in China). And FDR ramrodded industrial planning which greatly enhanced the nations conversion to a war economy (some saying it saved 2 years time, when compared to the Great War).

The reason why FDR could not be more overt in his moves was there was considerable opposition to US entry into what was considered as "Europe's War". There was the America First moverment, the German-American Bund, and the Republican Party all making it difficult for FDR.

May I suggest you read articles from the newspapers from the era.